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I. INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace raises a variety of thought-provoking trademark and
trademark-related issues. While many of the issues and problems that
arise may be analyzed and resolved from the vantage point of traditional
notions of trademark law, others present thornier questions requiring
greater sensitivity to the practical effect of cyberspace on the commer-
cial marketplace.
The cyberspace trademark issue that continues to get the most press
is the domain name controversy. Is a domain a trademark? When does
use of a domain infringe trademark rights? If someone else registers a
company's name or trademark as their domain, what can the company
do? Beyond domains lie the vast array of trademark issues that ulti-
mately are likely to be more important than domain disputes. Questions
of what constitutes use, and abuse, of trademarks in cyberspace are ex-
ploding along with the web. In addition to garden variety trademark
enhancement and policing concerns that take new shapes on the Inter-
net, companies must be vigilant in avoiding trademark dilution and
think twice before linking to other sites or permitting others to link to
the company's site using company logos. Attempting to police trade-
mark rights in cyberspace can be a daunting, but infinitely interesting,
task.
II. DOMAIN NAMES
A company's presence on the Net starts with its domain name
("domain"). A domain is an important corporate identifier. Beyond be-
ing the name under which the company sends and receives e-mail, like
any other trademark or trade name it can be a symbol of the company's
goodwill and recognition in the marketplace. Given the unstructured
nature of the Internet, obtaining an easily ascertained domain name of-
ten is a key element of an on-line marketing strategy. Users regularly
attempt to guess a company's Internet location by typing in the name of
the company followed by the ubiquitous .con top level domain. This
common practice of guessing at domain names makes an intuitive do-
main name a valuable corporate asset.
Generally speaking, domain names are assigned on a first come,
first served basis. In the U.S. today, the vast majority of domains are
assigned by a single registry, Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), under
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contract from the National Science Foundation.! In assigning a domain,
NSI uses a multi-level system, including a Top Level Domain ("TLD")
such as ".com", ".net" and ".org", coupled with a Second Level Domain
("SLD") requested by the party seeking the domain assignment (e.g.,
<ibm.com>). Not surprisingly, the .com TLD, intended for commercial
users has experienced exponential growth in the recent past; there are
now over three million such domains.2 As would have been expected
from such growth, the .com TLD is at the eye of the storm in domain
disputes. Overseas, any number of registration entities (called NICs' or
registries) assign individual country TLDs using two character ISO
country codes, such as ".ca" for Canada or ".fr" for France.4 Due to the
international cachet that has developed in .com names, many overseas
business have bypassed country TLDs and have registered .com do-
mains with NSI instead.
In the registration process, NSI (and the other NICs) will not exer-
cise veto power over a requested name, so long as that name is not
identical to one already assigned within the TLD.5 Prior to the commer-
cial explosion of the web, the domain name system engendered little or
no controversy. Only with the advent of the web, and the commercial
world's awakening to the enormous marketing possibilities it repre-
sented, did this system come under scrutiny.
A. The Problems
As the commercial world expanded into cyberspace, three related
problems with the domain name system became painfully clear. The
first and most obvious problem is the opportunity for others to "pirate"
names, typically by obtaining SLD registrations within the .com TLD of
a well-known company name or brand. A number of major corporations
1. Under the contract, NSI has been delegated the authority to act as the central Inter-
net registry administering the '.com', '.net', '.org', '.edu' and '.gov' TLD's. The '.com',
'.net' and '.org' TLD's are considered worldwide generic domains ('gTLD') that may be
registered to individuals, companies or institutions located anywhere in the world. The or-
ganization currently responsible for overall coordination and management of the domain
name assignment system is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ('LANA'). LANA pur-
portedly was chartered by the Internet Society, an international organizatiori that provides
leadership in Internet standards, issues, and education. The Internet Architecture Board
('IAB') and the Internet Engineering Task Force ('IETF') also have historical and continuing
roles in administering the domain name system.
2. As of November 17, 1998, InterNIC had registered over three million names. See
<http://www.internic.net/announcements>.
3. NIC is an abbreviation for 'network information center.'
4. There is also an underutilized '.us' TLD for the United States.
5. Some overseas NICs do, however, require that the party requesting a particular do-
main be registered to do business under that name.
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have had the uncomfortable, and in some cases embarrassing, experi-
ence of learning that someone else had already registered their name or
mark as a second level domain followed by the now ubiquitous .com
TLD. By May 1994, the list of "pirated" names read like a Who's Who
of corporate America: McDonald's, Coke, Hertz, Nasdaq, Viacom,
MTV and others. By mid-1996, Avon, Levi's, B. Dalton and Readers
Digest had joined the list. In 1997, a California college student, Daniel
Khoshnood, started a web design firm called The Microsoft Network.
Inspired by Steve Jenkins' successful <windows95.com> web site,
Khoshnood not only obtained the domain <microsoftnetwork.con>, but
also registered dozens of other domain names closely resembling well
known trademarks owned by Microsoft and others (e.g.
<cinemania97.com> and <creativewriter.com>). In June 1997, Micro-
soft lawyers convinced Khoshnood's Internet service provider to pull
the plug on his web site, but he then planned to relocate the site using
6the same domain on his own server.
Misspelling popular brands is the second problem. The domain
name system creates the opportunity for others to obtain a second level
domain that is only a slight variation of someone else's well known, or
not so well known, name or mark. Indeed, some "entrepreneurs" even
register slight variations of others' marks for the sole purpose of getting
hits, thus capitalizing on typing errors made by web surfers. These
speculators often sell only advertising rather than products or services,
while legitimate companies that happen to have a similar domain will
disclose that theirs is not the site the surfer actually was seeking.7
The third problem, a variation on a theme, is created by the fact that
NSI is not alone in assigning domains: NICs and other registries all over
the world may assign identical second level domains, so long as the
TLD differs. Again, while Microsoft may be <microsoft.com>, there
6. See Joe Mullich, Coffee Break: Some Play Net Domain Game Hoping for Big Gain,
BUSINESS FIRST, Aug. 25, 1997, at 18. The results of a 'whois' search on
<http://www.intemeic.netcgi-binlwhois?microsoftnetwork.dom> conducted on January 28,
1999, indicate that the domain is still registered to Khoshnood but evidently does not have a
server location.
7. Further complications arise with regard to user names and subdomains. Although
NSI may assign second level domains, domain holders are free to create any number of sub-
domains and user names. Thus, the journalist who registered <mcdonalds.com>, in part to
call attention to the reality that only the affluent have access to the Internet, used the moni-
ker 'Ronald' (ronald@mcdonalds.com). See Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered, WImRD
MAGAZINE, October 1994 (visited April 22, 1999) <http://www.wired.com/%vired/
archive/2.10/mcdonalds-pr.html>. Likewise, there was nothing, other than trademark law, to
prevent the registrant of the <windows95.com> domain from using a subdomain such as
'microsoft' (<microsoft.windows95.com>) even accompanied by the user name 'gates'
(gates@microsoft.windows95.com).
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may also be a completely unaffiliated <microsoft.co.uk> commercial
domain in England or a <microsoft.az> in Azerbaijan.
Not surprisingly, the first lawsuits in the domain name area in-
volved situations in which intentional "pirating" was admitted or at least
alleged. In the first case, Princeton Review Management Corp. v. Stan-
ley H. Kaplan Educational Center, Ltd., Kaplan did not take kindly to
its competitor's use of <kaplan.com> in connection with a web site
containing messages disparaging Kaplan's educational testing services
and praising those of Princeton Review. Kaplan refused Princeton Re-
view's offer to relinquish the name in exchange for a case of beer, and
ultimately convinced an arbiter to order Princeton Review to give up the
domain.'
Planned Parenthood, the well-known non-profit reproductive health
organization, recently was the target of a similar effort by a
"competitor" to divert attention on the web. In Planned Parenthood
Federation of America. v. Bucci,9 Planned Parenthood obtained an in-
junction against an anti-abortion and anti-birth control advocate who set
up a web site at <www.plannedparenthood.com> to provide information
and promote sales of an anti-abortion book. Planned Parenthood was
operating its own web site at <www.ppfa.org> (and its Houston affiliate
at <www.plannedparenthood.org>). In finding a likelihood of confusion
the court noted that the defendant admitted that he chose the domain
name with the intent to divert Internet users who were seeking Planned
Parenthood's web site to his own competing site.10
8. Other cases followed, with more or less amusing facts. MTV Networks v. Curry,
867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), involved a former MTV 'video jockey' ('VJ'), who,
while employed at MTV, had registered <mtv.com> under his own name with the Com-
pany's approval. Curry established a large Internet following, and, when he left MTV
acrimoniously, he refused to give up the domain. MTV filed suit, and the case settled quietly
on March 24, 1995 with control of the disputed domain passing to MTV. Another case,
Counsel of Better Business Bureau v. Sloo (D. Kan. 1995), also settled quickly, after the
Better Business Bureau brought suit against an individual who had registered the domains
<bbb.com> and <bbb.org>, although he was providing no services and allegedly registered
the domains only in an attempt to force the Better Business Bureau to purchase them. See
Martin Rosenberg, E-mail Conflict Triggers a Lawsuit ; KC Man Controls Internet Address
That a Business Council Wants to Claim, KANSAS CITY STAR, May 16, 1995, at D3.
Avon had a similar experience. In Avon v. Carnetta Wong Assoc., CV96-0451
(E.D.N.Y. 1996), Avon included allegations of dilution under the then new Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act, in addition to its claims of trademark infringement and unfair
competition stemming from the defendant's registration of the domain <avon.com>. That
case settled and Avon obtained control of the domain. See Cornelia Grumman, Web of Inter-
net Name Game Getting Tangled, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 25, 1996, at Cl.
9. See Planned Parenthood Federation of America. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997).
10. See also Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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Inevitably, the domain name case law moved beyond the context of
"pirating" well-known names and into the realm of the more typical
trademark dispute between two parties vying for the same name. Comp
Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc.," is the first case in which a U.S.
court applied a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis in the con-
text of a domain dispute. In that case, Juris, Inc., owner of a federal
trademark registration of JURIS for its legal time and billing software
products, had been forced to choose the domain <jurisinc.com> after
learning its first choice, <juris.com>, had already been assigned to The
Comp Examiner Agency ("Comp Examiner"). When Juris, Inc. subse-
quently accused Comp Examiner of trademark infringement, Comp
Examiner, which used the domain for a legal information web site, filed
an action seeking cancellation of Juris, Inc.'s JURIS trademark registra-
tion on grounds of genericness. Juris, Inc. then counterclaimed for
trademark infringement and dilution. The court granted Juris, Inc. a
preliminary injunction which not only precluded Comp Examiner from
using the domain <juris.com>, but also from using "juris,"
<juriscom.com> or any confusingly similar variation for "the advertis-
ing, operation or maintenance of any Internet site or bulletin board
service."'" The lawsuit settled shortly thereafter. Juris, Inc. now owns
both domains, and operates under the domain <juris.com>.1
3
While Comp Examiner Agency essentially involved a "garden vari-
ety" claim of likelihood of confusion concerning related services, the
limited availability of any particular SLD in the .com domain space has
spawned similar litigation involving wholly unrelated goods and serv-
ices. One such case, though originally scheduled for trial, resulted in a
default judgment now on appeal. In Fry's Electronics, Inc. v. Octave
Systems, Inc.,4 an electronics retailer in Palo Alto, California brought
suit alleging trademark infringement and federal Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") claims against a Seattle-
11. See Comp Examiner Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., No. 96-0213-WMB, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20259, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1996).
12. Id. at *3.
13. Interestingly, this is not the only case involving the SLD 'juris'. Underscoring the
international nature of the domain name system and its relevance to trademark owners, on
January 15, 1997 a court in Munich, Germany ruled that the defendant before that court
could not retain the domain <juris.de> and the plaintiff was entitled to have the domain
transferred to it. Landgericht Mfinchen, January 15, 1997, 1 HKO 3146/96.
14. Fry's Electronics v. Ocatave Systems, Inc., No. 95-CV-02525 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(entering default judgement). For detailed information concerning the case, See Law Sub-
jects Index Domain Name Disputes, Cases: E-O (visited Apr. 21, 1999) <http:ll
www.jmls.edu/cyber/cases/domain2.html@frys>; Patricia Gima, A Domain, By any Other
Name, CYBERLAW JOURNAL (visited Apr. 21, 1999) <http://newmedia.com/Sound/
cyberlaw.html>.
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based vendor of french fry machines, Frenchy Frys, after it learned that
Frenchy Frys had registered the domain <frys.com> and Fry's Elec-
tronics was left with its second choice as a domain,
<fryselectronics.com>.
The Fry's Electronics court issued the default judgment in response
to what the court termed "obstructionist behavior" by codefendant
David Peter, proprietor of Frenchy Frys. Peter, who is appearing pro se,
is currently appealing the decision to the Ninth Circuit. 5 In the mean-
time, Fry's Electronics has achieved its goal of obtaining the right to use
the <frys.com> domain name without the obvious difficulty of estab-
lishing a likelihood of confusion between unrelated goods and services,
16although the company does not yet appear to be using the domain.
Another inevitable development in domain name litigation occurred
in December 1994, when NSI was named as a defendant in Knowledge-
Net v. Boone. 7 The first case to challenge NSI's procedures for
assigning domain names, KnowledgeNet included a RICO claim against
NSI and Boone's Internet service provider for aiding and abetting, via
the Internet and the telephone system, Boone's "illegal enterprise" to
misappropriate the KNOWLEDGENET trademark using the domain
<knowledgenet.com> and licensing the same. NSI ultimately was dis-
missed as a party, without prejudice, but only after the primary parties
reached a settlement in which Boone gave up the domain and reportedly
paid a hefty sum to the plaintiff. 8
B. NSI's Existing Solution
Faced with an ever increasing chorus of complaints from trademark
owners regarding the domain assignment system, NSI initially reacted
by adopting a policy that an applicant could obtain only one domain.
(This policy was rarely, if ever, enforced.) NSI then imposed a fee for
obtaining and/or renewing a domain (presently $100 for the first two
years; $70 a year thereafter).' 9 These changes were intended to put an
15. Fry's Electronics v. Peter, appeal docketed, No. 97-15485 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 1997).
16. According to an InterNIC <http:///www.interneic.netcgi-bin/whois?
microsoftnetwork.dom> 'whois' search on January 28, 1999, the domain is registered to Fry's
Electronics but the firm has not yet used the domain name.
17. See KnowledgeNet v. Boone, No. 1-94-CV-7195 (N.D. 111. filed Dec. 2, 1994).
18. For details concerning this case, See Logical Choices? Part I-Someone Else's
Trademark (visited Apr. 21, 1999) <http:llwww.e-lav.co.il/DomainNames/
logicalrec4.htm@knowledgenet>; Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Catherine Simmons-Gill, President of INTA).
19. Registration fee is $100.00 for domain names registered on or before March 31,
1998, $70.00 for domain names registered on or after April 1, 1998. New domain names are
valid for two years from the date that the Registrar activates the domain name. The renewal
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end to the initially prevalent practice in which a few speculators
grabbed multiple domains containing well-known company names or
marks for the purpose of selling the domains to the respective compa-
nies at premium prices.
Finding itself the target of litigation, and with hopes of avoiding
further legal entanglements like KnowledgeNet, NSI adopted its Domain
Name Dispute Policy, which has been revised several times since. Un-
der the dispute policy currently in effect, NSI Domain Name Dispute
Policy Revision 03, effective February 25, 1998,20 the owner of a federal
trademark registration in the U.S. or a registration in a foreign country
may challenge use of an identical second level domain by submitting
the registration certificate to NSI, along with proof that the trademark
owner has sent the domain holder written notice of the trademark
owner's claim that the use and registration of the domain name violates
the trademark owner's legal rights. If the "creation date" of the domain
postdates the "effective date" of the trademark registration, then NSI
gives the domain holder 30 days to prove its ownership of a trademark
registration for the same mark in the U.S. or any foreign country.'
If the domain holder is able to prove either (1) that the creation of
the domain name predates the effective date of the challenger's trade-
mark registration, or (2) that the domain holder has its own trademark
registration, then the domain holder will be able to keep the domain
(subject to the general obligation of all domain registrants to indemnify
NSI and NSF). If, however, the domain holder cannot demonstrate the
required prior creation date or produce a trademark registration certifi-
cate, then the domain holder must give up the domain, with a 90 day
transition period if the domain holders cooperates. The disputed domain
fee for domain names registered on or before March 31, 1998 is $70.00 US and $35.00 for
domain names registered on or after April 1, 1998. See Fee for Registration of Domain
Names (visited Apr. 21, 1999) <http://www.networksolutions.comlannouncements/fee-
policy.html>.
20. See Network Solutions' Domain Dispute Policy (REV 03) (visited Feb. 22, 1999)
<http://netsol.com/rs/dispute-policy.html>.
21. The language of the Revision 03 policy reads '9. Dispute Procedures... (a) Network
Solutions shall determine the creation date of the registrant's domain name registration
('domain name creation date'). (b) If the registrant's domain creation date precedes the ef-
fective date of the valid and subsisting certified registration owned by the complainant,
Network Solutions will take no action on the complainant's request.' The policy does not
define either 'creation date' or 'effective date.' Although no comments have been made thus
far regarding how NSI will determine the 'creation date,' there have been conflicting reports
about the anticipated meaning NSI will give to the 'effective date.' According to one report,
Chuck Gomes, NSI spokesperson, said that the effective date will be the earlier of the first
use and registration dates. In a subsequent report, Leslie A. Gutowski, Manager of NSI's
Dispute Administration, is quoted as saying 'Network Solutions, Inc. considers the filing
date of a U.S. trademark registration to be the effective date.' See NSI Flawed Domain Name
Policy Information Page (visited Apr. 21, 1999) <http://www.patents.com/nsi.sht>.
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then goes into a "hold" status, where it is not available to anyone pend-
ing the outcome of the dispute between the parties. Among the many
domains that have been placed on hold under the policy are the follow-
ing (challenger follows in parentheses): <dc.com> (DC Comics),
<newton.com> (Apple Computer), and <thegap.com> (The Gap), which
NSI subsequently released while the parties continued their negotia-
tions.2
While the February 1998 revision to the dispute policy serves
mainly to clarify the existing policy, NSI made several significant
changes. For example, it appears a trademark owner may no longer base
a challenge on the grounds that its first use of the trademark (now reg-
istered) predated activation of the domain.23 Instead, the registration on
which the trademark holder relies must have an "effective date" before
"creation" of the domain. If "effective date" is interpreted as "filing
date" or "registration date," then it will be more difficult for U.S.
trademark owners in particular to qualify to mount a challenge, as the
effective date of the registration may be years after the trademark owner
established trademark rights via use. While such trademark rights ap-
pear to be no longer cognizable at all under NSI's dispute policy-with
or without a related trademark registration-the rights of other trade-
mark owners who have never used the mark in question but can take
advantage of an early effective date in a jurisdiction that does not re-
quire use to obtain a trademark registration are recognized.
In the February 1998 revision, NSI also broadened its discretion in
domain name disputes by articulating that it may require "suspension,
transfer or other modifications to a domain name."2 4 Prior to this point,
NSI would not, absent a court order or settlement between the dispu-
tants, transfer or modify a domain name.
22. For a directory of domain names and their 'on hold' status, visit
<httpfl:www.lawoffices.net/tradedeom/>. In what appears to be an aberration, in July, 1997
NSI terminated the domain <nasa.com> following a complaint from the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA), without adhering to the dispute policy. The
<www.nasa.com> site apparently contained links to pornographic sites which allegedly con-
cerned individuals who, hoping to view groundbreaking photographs from the Mars
Pathfinder mission, had mistakenly gone to <www.nasa.com> not realizing that NASA's site
is <www.nasa.gov>. The chagrined owner of <nasa.com>, Epicenter Network of New York,
apparently contemplated seeking an injunction against NSI. NSI based its decision on The
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (amended) which prohibits private groups from
identifying themselves as 'NASA.' See Leslie Gornstein, Net Address Errors Spell Success;
Slip of Fingers Can Divert Users From Popular Sites To Porno Ads, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Aug. 23, 1998, at B3.
23. But see Comp Examiner Agency, Inc., supra note 11.
24. See Network Solutions' Domain Dispute Policy (REV 03), at 7 (visited Feb. 22,
1999) <http://netsol.com/rs/dispute-policy.html>.
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C. The Problems With NSI's Solution
While perhaps a boon to some large and/or lucky entities who hap-
pen to own the right trademark registrations, NSI's chosen solution did
little more than create additional uproar over the domain name system.
The engineering community objected to the imposition of a user fee in
what always has been a free system, and many legitimate businesses are
finding that they are suddenly confronted with the loss of a domain in
which they have invested significant financial and other resources.
The NSI system is biased, many say unfairly, in favor of those who
have obtained trademark registrations because it ignores common law
rights and infringement analysis (likelihood of consumer confusion), the
underpinnings of trademark jurisprudence in this country.
At the same time, a challenger may find the dispute policy to be of
limited value in policing its trademark rights. Would NSI find that the
domain <buslnessweek.com> is "identical" to the registered trademark
BUSINESSWEEK?2 Also, even a successful challenge under the policy
does not necessarily immediately entitle the trademark owner to the
domain; in the past, NSI would simply place the domain on hold pend-
ing a resolution of the dispute.26
Initially, NSI's hope of avoiding lawsuits with the dispute policy
was not entirely realized. Far from shielding NSI from litigation, the
dispute policy-at least earlier versions of it-actually may have
spawned it. The lawsuits domain holders have filed against NSI illus-
trate the spectrum of trademark law concerns implicated by the dispute
policy.
In the first case, Roadrunner Computer Systems, Inc. v. Network
Solutions, Inc.,27 Roadrunner Computer (RCS) filed suit against NSI to
25. On September 19, 1996, David Graves of NSI offered the following clarification of
the policy requirement that the trademark and second level domain name must be identical:
'We normally discount spaces, small adjectives, and common abbreviations for companies
and corporations. For example, a trademark for The Washington Post would be identical to
the domain name <washingtonpost.com>. Or, a trademark for 'Network Solutions' would be
identical to the domain name <networksolutionsinc.com>. Other variants are evaluated on a
case-by-case basis....' This clarification leaves open several interesting questions, such as
whether phonetic identity is sufficient to invoke the policy, e.g., whether 'tie' is identical to
Ity.,
26. This may change now that NSI has given itself the authority to transfer domains.
There has been litigation against NSI on this aspect of its policy in the past, where the owner
of a well-known mark has found it necessary to bring suit after the dispute policy has been
invoked and the offending domain put on hold. See Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v.
Chen, No. 96 CV 01006 (E.D. Va. filed July 26, 1996) (granting injunction that prevented
defendants, the International Porsche Club of New York City, from using the <porsche.com>
domain or any of plaintiff's other trademarks or trade dress).
27. See Roadrunner Computer Systems, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 96-413-A
(E.D. Va. filed March 26, 1996).
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enjoin NSI from placing the <roadrunner.con> domain on hold, and to
require NSI to adopt "fair and evenhanded" dispute policies. NSI coun-
terclaimed for declaratory relief that its policy was not subject to court
review.2
RCS had obtained the domain <roadrunner.com> in May 1994, and
thereafter offered Internet services in connection with the domain. In
December 1995, NSI informed RCS of a challenge to RCS's domain by
Warner Bros., which holds an August 9, 1995 U.S. trademark registra-
tion for ROAD RUNNER for "toys, namely, plush dolls, and Halloween
costumes and masks."29
Warner Bros. then apparently gave RCS the courtesy of extending
the 30 day period for RCS's response several times. RCS used the time
to secure a Tunisian trademark registration, a copy of which RCS then
submitted to NSI to counter Warner Bros.' U.S. trademark registration.
NSI refused to accept the proffered Tunisian trademark registration. 3
However, before the court could address the substantive issues
raised, the case resolved itself. Other than initiating the domain name
challenge, Warner Bros. had pursued no claim against RCS; likewise
Warner Bros. was not a party to the suit. Presumably seeking a way out
of the litigation, in June NSI queried Warner Bros. as to whether it was
continuing to suffer "legal harm" as a result of use of the domain. When
NSI received what it considered a less than affirmative response, NSI
announced that it was terminating the challenge proceedings against the
domain, released the hold, and moved the court to dismiss the case as
moot. On June 21, 1996, over RCS's objection, the court obliged.3
Roadrunner is a concrete example of the failure of NSI's dispute
policy to take into account the cornerstone of trademark infringement
analysis: likelihood of confusion. Except in the relatively rare dilution
context, a trademark owner's rights cover only use of similar marks in
connection with those goods or services sufficiently related to the
trademark owner's so as to create a potential for consumer confusion as
to source, origin, or affiliation. The dispute policy, therefore, awards the
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. RCS alleged that NSI based that refusal on the technicality that the 30 day period
for submitting a registration had passed. NSI asserted that RCS failed to provide a certified
copy of the registration as required in the Domain Name Dispute Policy. Although NSI
would not accept RCS's uncertified registration, seeking a quick registration overseas before
launching a domain name dispute is still a legitimate strategy. The trademark office for the
Benelux processes registrations quickly, and some Benelux practitioners now advise that
registrations can be obtained within one month for domain disputes. By comparison, obtain-
ing a U.S. registration usually takes over a year.
31. Interestingly, shortly thereafter Time Warner, Inc. announced that its new high
speed Internet access service would be named ROAD RUNNER.
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holder of a trademark registration certificate a far greater scope of pro-
tection against use of the same name than most trademark holders could
ever hope to achieve in seeking to prevent use of the same mark, com-
pany name or designation other than a domain name.
The second case challenging the dispute policy, Data Concepts
Inc. v. Digital Consulting Inc. and Network Solutions Inc. ,32 highlights
an even more serious inequity inherent in the dispute policy, that of fa-
voring trademark owners who have registered their marks over those
who have not registered, but who nonetheless may have superior trade-
mark rights. Digital Consulting filed a challenge with NSI over Data
Concepts' continued use of the <dci.com> domain, on the basis of
Digital Consulting's 1987 U.S. trademark registration of DCI for busi-
ness management software and related services.
Although Data Concepts claimed to have used DCI as a trademark
in interstate commerce and internationally in connection with its data
management and process control software for business and industry
since at least 1982, five years prior to Digital Consulting's trademark
use of DCI, Data Concepts did not have a trademark registration to
trump Digital Consulting's under the dispute policy. Under NSI's pol-
icy, Data Concepts, therefore, was in danger of losing the domain it had
used since August 1993. Having no other options under the dispute
policy, Data Concepts, the domain holder, filed suit.
After having taken the position that its domain name dispute policy
is beyond the reach of the courts in that it essentially is executive branch
policy by virtue of the contractual relationship between NSI and the
National Science Foundation, NSI later stipulated that it would not in-
terrupt Data Concepts' continued use of <dci.com> absent a court order.
The parties then agreed to drop NSI as a party to the suit.
33
On May 20, 1997, the court granted Digital Consulting's motion to
enjoin Data Concepts' use of the "dci.com" domain namer The court
did so by adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge
who considered both Digital Consulting's motion to enjoin and Data
Concepts' motion for summary judgment.35 Under a traditional likeli-
hood of confusion analysis, the district court concluded that the rights of
Digital Consulting in its registered trademark DCI were superior to the
rights of Data Concepts.
32. See Data Concepts Inc. v. Digital Consulting Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998).
33. See id. at 623.
34. See Data Concepts Inc. v. Digital Consulting Inc., No. 3-96-0429 (M.D. Tenn. filed
May 20, 1997).
35. See Data Concepts, 150 F.3d at 622.
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Data Concepts' mo-
tion for summary judgment, but reversed the grant of summary
judgment for Digital Consulting and remanded for further proceedings.36
The Sixth Circuit found that the magistrate judge's likelihood of confu-
sion analysis was inadequate with respect to various factors, including
strength of the mark, relatedness of services, similarity of the marks,
likely degree of purchaser care, and Data's intent in selecting the mark.37
Somewhat surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit also held that, as a matter of
law, the mark used by Data Concepts prior to their domain name regis-
tration was not the legal equivalent of the mark used in connection with
dci.com a8 The Sixth Circuit then compared Digital Consulting's federal
trademark registration date of 1987 with Data Concepts' domain name
registration date of 1993 to conclude that Data Concepts was not a sen-
ior user."
The Sixth Circuit's opinion also addressed a problematic aspect of
both NSI's domain dispute policy, and the status of trademark law at
this time. In Data Concepts, Judge Merritt wrote "I concur... but I be-
lieve that there is a serious question regarding whether Data Concepts'
use of the dci.com domain name constituted use of a trademark in the
first place."'
The Data Concepts case draws attention to a serious flaw in NSI's
domain dispute policy. Because the policy does not take into account
trademark rights that exist on the basis of use alone (common law
rights), inequitable situations will arise where the party who actually has
superior trademark rights, based on seniority of use, is forced to relin-
quish the domain to the junior trademark user who had the foresight to
register the mark. In this regard, the dispute policy resembles the trade-
mark laws of numerous jurisdictions outside the United States, which
award trademark rights to the first to register, not the first to use. These
laws impose the burden on the trademark owner to protect its own inter-
est in using the mark by registering it. This is not, however, the law in
the United States, where substantive trademark rights have always been
based on common law notions of seniority of use. Moreover the logic of
protecting the interest of the party who went to the trouble of registering
its trademark breaks down when the converse-the first to obtain a do-
main name-is not also protected. Obviously, to a significant degree,
36. See id. at 627.
37. See id.
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the dispute policy is an effort to protect the interests of the senior user
of a name, but in this key respect it falls short of the mark.
Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., the third case involving a
challenge to NSI's dispute policy, is the first in which a court enjoined a
trademark holder from interfering with use of the domain. 41 The court
enjoined defendant TY, Inc. ("TY"), a stuffed toy manufacturer that
owns a trademark registration for the word TY superimposed on a heart
("TY and design") for stuffed toys, from interfering with Giacalone's
right to use the <ty.com> domain pending final judgment on the com-
plaint. The court further required TY "to take any and all steps
necessary to see that Plaintiff's right to use the domain name <ty.com>
is undisturbed and not suspended or interfered with in any way, due to
the past, present or future efforts of the Defendant TY in contacting
third parties and seeking suspension of Plaintiff's right to use the name
by alleging trademark infringement claims., 42 The court apparently was
unmoved by TY's claim that because Giacalone, a computer consultant,
had included on his web site (accessed by using the URL
<http://www.ty.com>) comments analogizing his web software to chil-
dren's toys, trademark infringement or dilution was manifest. TY's
appeal was pending when the case settled.43
The case raises two important issues relevant to the dispute policy.
First, it suggests another aspect to NSI's broad view of what it considers
to be an identical mark as is required for purposes of initiating a chal-
lenge under the policy. While it may not be surprising that NSI viewed
<roadrunner.com> (the domain) and ROAD RUNNER (the trademark)
to be identical, it requires a greater stretch to conclude that <ty.com>
(the domain) and TY and design (the trademark) are also identical. The
fact that NSI ultimately determines whether names are identical on a
case-by-case basis casts another element of uncertainty into the mix."
Second, the NSI dispute policy overlooks the very real possibility
that many different parties may each legitimately claim equal rights to
use a particular mark or name. Giacalone, who chose the domain
<ty.com> as a tribute to his son "TY," alleged that at least four U.S.
41. See Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-96 20434 RPA/PVT, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20807, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996) (granting preliminary injunction).
42. Id.
43. NSI had stipulated that if an injunction was issued against Ty, Inc., NSI would take
no action with regard to the domain, pending final judgment. Before final judgment was
reached, the parties settled and, in exchange for an undisclosed amount, Giacalone trans-
ferred the <ty.com> domain to Ty, Inc. See J. Theodore Smith, Note, '1-800-Ripoffs.com:
Internet Domain Names Are the Telephone Numbers of Cyberspace, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv.
1169, 1186 (1997).
44. Note that NSI's Revision 03 requires that a challenger hold a trademark that is
identical to the domain name with no accompanying design.
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trademark registrations exist for TY for such diverse goods as jewelry,
screws, sausage processing machinery, and brushing tools. ' In re-
sponding to the U.S. Trademark Office's initial rejection of the "TY"
and design application due to a pre-existing registration of TY
TARGET for dolls, TY, Inc. relied on the same principle, arguing that
no likelihood of confusion existed because "Ty" was a first name enti-
tled to only a "narrow scope of protection" and because different images
were evoked by "TY within a heart, and TY TARGET.
46
The dispute over the <pike.com> domain further illustrates this in-
herent inequity in NSI's dispute policy. In Pike v. Network Solutions,
Inc.,47 Peter Pike ("Mr. Pike"), a California realtor, obtained the do-
mains <pike.com>, <pike.net>, and <pikenet.cont>, for use in his real
estate business. Subsequently, Floyd S. Pike Electrical Contractor, Inc.,
("Pike Electrical"), a North Carolina power line repair company, initi-
ated a challenge to Mr. Pike's retention of <pike.com>, submitting to
NSI a U.S. trademark registration of PIKE, in stylized letters, for elec-
trical power line installation and repair and related services. Mr. Pike
trumped that registration with a Tunesian registration for PIKE, recently
issued. NSI responded by allowing Mr. Pike to keep the domain (after
he agreed to indemnify NSI).' Subsequently, however, NSI modified its
dispute policy to preclude a domain holder from relying on a trademark
registration that issued after the initial challenge, which had been the
case with <pike.com>.49 Pike Electrical then initiated a new challenge to
the domain, and NSI indicated it would cut off the domain in 30 days.
Mr. Pike then brought suit, inter alia, against NSI for breach of contract
and against Pike Electrical for a declaration of non-infringement. NSI
was dismissed without prejudice on February 10, 1997.50
Network Solutions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.5" another challenge
to NSI's policy, involved several firsts: the first domain case filed in
state court; the first preliminary injunction issued against NSI (June 25,
1996), precluding NSI from interfering with the <clue.con> domain;
and NSI's first attempt to try its interpleader theory in federal court,
45. See Plaintiff's Complaint, Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(No. C096 20434) (available at <http://www.iplawyers.com/CyberCounsel/ gia-
calone._vsnetwork_solutions.htn>).
46. Response to TY and design Office Action, August 23, 1990. The trademark exam-
iner apparently was persuaded and a registration was issued for TY as word mark No.
2118114 on February 13, 1997.
47. No. 96-CV-4256 (N.D. Cal. filed November 25, 1996).




51. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc. 946 F. Supp. 858 (D. Colo. 1996).
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filing a suit in which it attempted to deposit the domain name with the
court and asked that Clue Computing be restrained from pursuing the
state court action, that the federal court handle the case, and that NSI be
released and discharged from any liability.'2 While procedurally unique,
Clue is factually reminiscent of Roadrunner and Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet
Entertainment Group, Ltd.,53 discussed infra. Clue Computing, a com-
puter consulting firm, obtained the domain <clue.com> in August of
1994 and began using it shortly thereafter. On January 26, 1996, Has-
bro, Inc. submitted its trademark registration of CLUE for board games,
which dates back to the 1950s, to NSI. Lacking a trademark registration,
Clue Computing filed suit to prevent the loss of the domain.
NSI's effort to move the case to federal court and to interplead the
domain failed; the court ruled that NSI could not fulfill the interpleader
requirement of depositing the domain name with the federal court be-
cause the domain was not under NSI's control so long as the state
court's injunction was in effect.' The federal court then dismissed the
claim and denied NSI's motion for reconsideration.5 Bringing the liti-
gation full circle, a federal court in Massachusetts has denied Clue
Computing's motion to dismiss federal trademark infringement action
brought by Hasbro against Clue.56 Hasbro, the court held, had shown
sufficient contacts by Clue Computing with Massachusetts (through its
Internet site) to enable the court to exercise jurisdiction.57
NSI has been named as a defendant in at least seven additional
cases. 8 While challenges to NSI and its dispute policy remain on several
52. See id. at 860.
53. No. C96-130WD, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11627 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 5 1996)
(granting temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in case involving the do-
main <candyland.com>), and No. C96-130WD, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 9, 1996) (granting preliminary injunction after oral argument).
54. See Clue Computing, 946 F. Supp. at 860.
55. See id. at 861.
56. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. filed Jan. 10,
1997).
57. See id. at 44.
58. See Panavision International v. Toeppen, 945 F.Supp. (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd 141
F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Dynamic Info Systems v. Network Solutions, Inc., 96-CV-1551
(D. Colo. filed June 24, 1996) (involving the domain <disc.cor>); Regis McKenna Inc. v.
Regis Corporation, 96-CV-20551 (N.D. Cal. filed July 9, 1996) (involving <regis.com>);
American Commercial Inc. v. Sports & Leisure International, Inc., Case 96-CV-713 (C.D.
Cal., filed July 25, 1996) (involving <mikasa.com>); Juno Online Services, L.P. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 96 CV 01505 (E.D. Va., filed Oct. 18, 1996) (involving the domain name
<juno.con>); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. CV 96-7438 DDP
(Anx) (C.D. Cal., filed Oct. 22, 1996 (involving <skunkworks.com>, <skunkworks.net>,
<skunkwerks.com> and <skunkwrks.com>) (discussed further in section I.E.); and Future-
dontics Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., Civ. No. BC 177549 (Ca. Super. Ct. Los Angeles
County, filed Sept. 8, 1997) (involving <1800dentist.com> and <800dentist.con>).
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court dockets, and new challenges to domain names are brought under
NSI's dispute policy every day, changes to the Domain Name System
are also being implemented. These changes will significantly alter the
landscape regarding domain name disputes and the role of the registrars
(whether NSI or others) in such disputes.
Despite the above litigation, two recent California cases, Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.9 and Academy of Motion Pic-
ture Arts and Sciences v. Network Solutions, Inci0 may help insulate
NSI from liability in future domain name disputes. The Lockheed court
found NSI was not a contributory trademark infringer merely by regis-
tering the domain. The Academy court reached the same result on
infringement, and on the Academy's dilution claim, held that NSI's act
of registering an Internet domain name that embodies another party's
registered trademark does not constitute a commercial use of the mark,
and thus does not constitute conduct prohibited under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.
D. A New Approach
The issue of domain names and trademark conflicts now plays out
on the world stage. On February 4, 1997, the IAHC, an 11-person Inter-
national Ad Hoc Committee created by the Internet Society in October
1996 at the request of LANA, issued its plan for the modification and
enhancement of the gTLD space.61 The IAHC had been charged with
responsibility for reviewing, modifying as appropriate, and implement-
ing, as warranted, the provisions of the Postel Proposal for enhancement
of the Domain Name System, already approved, in concept, by the In-
ternet Society Board of Directors, which plan called for the creation of
up to 150 new gTLDs in the first year (1996) alone, with more to fol-
low.62 Although the IAHC plan has been preempted by the U.S.
59. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F.Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal
1997).
60. See Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989
F.Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
61. See International Ad Hoc Comm., Final Report of the International Ad Hoc Com-
mittee: Recommendations for Administration and Management of gTLDs (final version Feb.
4, 1997) <http://vww.iahc.org/draft-iahc-recommend-00.html>. The author was a member of
the IAHC, serving as the International Trademark Association's (INTA) representative.
Other organizations naming representatives included two United Nations treaty organiza-
tions-The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU)-the Internet Society (ISOC), the Internet Architecture
Board (LAB), and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (LANA).
62. As a historical aside, before the Postel Proposal had gained significant momentum,
another proposal, which circulated briefly and was quickly withdrawn, would have done
away with domain names based on mnemonics (the essential character of SLDs) and simply
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government, its details remain important as the IAHC will likely have
continuing influence in determining domain name policy going forward.
The IAHC plan, designed to be self governing in nature, was for-
malized in a gTLD Memorandum of Understanding ("gTLD MoU"),
signed in Geneva on May 1, 1997.63 At least 170 companies and organi-
zations worldwide signed the proposal or declared their intent to sign.
64
The private company signatories included several prominent members
of the global Internet community, including Internet access providers,
Internet backbone service providers, and telecommunications compa-
nies, along with governmental and non-governmental organizations.65
To increase the available name space and reduce the cachet of the
.com gTLD, while at the same time being mindful of increased trade-
mark policing concerns as the domain space expands, the IAHC plan
(now typically referred to as the "gTLD-MoU" after the document in
which the plan is memorialized) would have added seven new gTLDs,
bringing the total generally available to ten (including .com, .org, and
.net). IAHC would have added the following:
.firm, for businesses or firms;
.store, for businesses selling goods;
.web, for entities emphasizing activities involving the world
wide web;64
.arts, for entities emphasizing cultural and entertainment activi-
ties;
used numbers instead. while such an approach would have eliminated all but the very rare
SLD policing concern for the business community, it is doubtful that the marketing arms of
that same community would have been enamored of such a radical about-face.
63. The Establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level
Domain Name Space of the Internet Domain Name System (final version Feb. 28, 1997) is
available at <http://www.gfld-mou.org/gTLD-moll.html>.
64. A list of signatories (last updated Jan. 12, 1999) is available at <http:ll
www.itu.int/net-itu/gtld-mou/signat.htm>.
65. Having accomplished this phase of its mission, the IAHC dissolved itself. An in-
terim Policy Oversight Committee (iPOC) is now working to implement the plan, including
the development of the council of registrars (CORE). The final Memorandum of Under-
standing for the Internet Council of Reigstrars (final version, Oct. 19, 1997) ('CORE MoU')
is available at <www.gtld-mou.org/docs/core-mou.htm> (visited Jan. 30, 1999). The CORE,
a permanent Policy Oversight Committee (POC), and a policy advisory board (PAB) made
up of all interested entities/individuals, essentially will administer the gTLD system.
66. Image Online Design, a private company claiming it had the sole right to administer
the top level domain .web brought suit against IAHC, Seeking a temporary restraining order
to prevent the organization's plan from going into effect. The court denied injunctive relief
(and Image Online Design voluntarily withdrew its claim). Dan Goodin, Suit to Block Inter-
net Plan Falters, THE RECORDER, May 2, 1997, at 3.
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.rec, for entities emphasizing recreational entertainment;
.info, for sites offering information services; and
.nom, for sites supported by individuals.
67
The plan contemplated numerous registrars dispersed worldwide
(over 80 had qualified by November 1997), who would have shared the
administration of all of the gTLDs. Within the gTLD space, registrar
policy would have been uniform as to, among other things, information
required of a domain name applicant before a domain would be as-
signed.
Mindful of the inequities inherent in NSI's dispute policy, the IAHC
plan, as initially conceived, recognized the essential role of the courts in
resolving trademark disputes.6 The plan did, however, include elements
that would have assisted trademark holders in policing their marks by
requiring enhanced information about each registrant. Under the NSI
registration policy, a registrant is required to provide only abbreviated
contact information and details about the Internet server it will use. By
contrast, each applicant for a domain name in the new gTLD space
would have submitted a detailed application, including not just accurate
and complete contact information, but also an explanation as to the ap-
plicant's interest in the SLD it has chosen and its intended use for the
domain.69 In addition, and importantly, the applicant would have been
required to agree to submit to the jurisdiction of appropriate courts in
the country where the domain registrar is located and to appoint an
agent for service of process. This requirement was designed to ensure
that the trademark owner would have at least one guaranteed venue
(there may or may not be others depending on the circumstances of
business activities, use of the domain, and nationality of the parties) in
which to pursue infringement litigation if necessary.
Under the IAHC plan, upon submission to the registrar, SLD appli-
cations would have been published on a publicly available website.7
67. International Ad Hoe Comm., supra note 61, at § 3.1.
68. But see discussion of newly revised proposed administrative challenge panels
guidelines, infra note 72 and accompanying text.
69. Applications for renewal, which would be required annually, would also contain this
information. See CORE MoU, supra note 65, Appendix C.
70. The initial draft of the IAHC plan contained a 60-day waiting period following pub-
lication on the web site before a domain would be assigned. The purpose of the waiting
period was to enable trademark owners to engage in routine policing efforts and, where a
problem appeared, to give the trademark owner and the domain name applicant time to at-
tempt to work out their differences, if any, before the domain applicant made a substantial
investment in a domain name it might have to change. As such, the waiting period was in-
tended to minimize the instances in which such disputes escalated to litigation. Due to a
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Trademark owners and search firms would therefore have had immedi-
ate access to all such information. Such improved information likely
would have proven an effective tool both for routine policing and for
pursuing infringers.7'
In addition, the IAHC plan included alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, including on-line mediation and arbitration, as well as a
novel "administrative challenge" approach intended to provide an ef-
fective enforcement tool, particularly for preemptive purposes. Under
this approach, an owner of "demonstrable intellectual property rights"
could have directly challenged a registered SLD, either before or after
the SLD had been assigned to a domain applicant.73 For example, upon a
challenge by Microsoft, an Administrative Challenge Panel (ACP),
composed of experts on trademark law and on the Internet, might have
concluded that no one other than Microsoft could obtain "microsoft" as
a SLD in a particular gTLD space or, possibly, in any gTLD space, de-
pending on the relevant circumstances and the showing made. What
those relevant circumstances would have been and how such a challenge
might have been resolved however, remains unclear.
Government intervention, however, has essentially mooted the
IAHC plan. The White House has now assigned responsibility for the
transition of the administration of the domain name system to a wholly
non-governmental entity. On June 5, 1998, the Administration released
its Policy Statement on the Control of the Internet Domain Name Sys-
tem. 4
The document encourages the private sector to create a non-profit,
U.S. based company which would take over most existing IANA func-
tions. The new corporation would oversee the creation of a competitive
market of registrars, registries, and gTLDs, while the government
"ramps down" NSI's current monopoly control over these functions.
The Statement suggests that the new corporation should be formed by
groundswell of opposition to the mandatory nature of the waiting period, principally voiced
by members of the Internet community to whom such a waiting period was anathema to the
open, essentially free and instantaneous nature of the domain name system specifically, and
the Internet generally, the IAHC modified the plan to include only a voluntary waiting pe-
riod.
71. The additional requirement that an applicant prepay before a domain will be as-
signed would be a further deterrent to some cybersquatters intent on making a 'fast buck'.
72. See International Ad Hoc Comm., [Revised] Substantive Guidelines Conderning
Administratvie Domain Name Challenge Panels (final version May 23, 1997)
<http://www.iahc.org/docslracps.htm> (promulgating substantive guidelines to be applied by
the adminstrative challenge panels under §8 of the gTLD-MoU).
73. See id. at III.
74. See United States Department of Commerce, Management of Internet Names
and Address: Statement of Policy (last modified June 5, 1998) <http:/Avww.ntia.
doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm>.
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late 1998, and that the total transition of IANA functions should be
completed by October 30, 2000.
Notably, the Policy Statement is short on specifics, beginning in-
stead with a statement of principles to guide the transition.7 Many
difficult questions are left to the newly formed corporation. For in-
stance, the Administration declines to add any new gTLDs (in contrast
to its proposal for 5 new gTLDs contained in the earlier draft referred to
as the "Green Paper") 76 , and recommends some measures that might be
implemented regarding trademark disputes involving domain names. It
also suggests that the new corporation be formed by a temporary
"interim board" made up of representatives from a mix of global techni-
cal, business, and other interests. Accordingly the intense debate over
domain name policy will likely continue after a short respite, once the
new corporation forms and begins setting its policies in more detail.
E. The Courts Weigh In On Trademark and Domain Disputes
1. U.S. Courts
Beyond questions of domain name registry policy and Internet gov-
ernance issues lies the reality that no matter what registry policy or
policies ultimately are adopted, disputes invariably will arise and courts
will be called upon to resolve those disputes. In the last year, several
federal courts reached the merits of some such domain disputes. In most
of these NSI was not an active participant.
One of the earliest decisions has so far remained the most extreme.
In an unreported case, Actmedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int'l, Inc., an Illi-
nois federal court reached a final judgment that the reservation alone of
someone else's famous trademark as a domain name constitutes trade-
mark infringement and dilution.77 Cases decided since then have
suggested limitations on this extreme view.
In a recent Oregon case, for example, a federal district court granted
summary judgment against a trademark infringement claim that was
based on the use of another company's registered trademark as part of a
75. The four principles mentioned in the statement are Stability, Competition, Private
(Bottom-up) Coordination, and Representation. See id., 'Comments and Responses: 1. Prin-
ciples for a New System.'
76. See United States Department of Commerce, A Proposal to Improve Technical
Management of Internet Names and Address Discussion, DRAFT 1/30/98 <http:/l
www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrff.htm> (last visited Feb. 3, 1998).
77. See Actmedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int'l, Inc., No. 96C 3448, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20814, at *3 (N.D. 111. July 12, 1996).
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domain name." Epix, Inc. was the owner of a federal registration for the
mark EPIX for "printed circuit boards and computer programs for image
acquisition, processing, display and transmission."7 9 Interstellar Starship
Services registered and used the domain name <epix.com>, and Epix,
Inc. charged Interstellar with trademark infringement. However, the
court found that Interstellar only used its epix.com web site to publicize
the activities of a theater group production called "The Rocky Horror
Picture Show." Interestingly, the court concluded that Interstellar's use
of <epix.com> could "initially" confuse actual or potential customers of
Epix, Inc. because they might go to the Interstellar web site when they
were seeking Epix, Inc. But the court held that the differences between
the parties' goods and services were such that Epix, Inc.'s customers
"could not be seriously confused" by the use of the domain name.'o
Of course, registration of another's mark as a domain name has
been held to infringe trademark rights in a number of cases, but these
have commonly involved more than mere registration. Three courts
have entered orders against a well-known "cybersquatter" and alleged
domain name pirate, Dennis Toeppen, for his registration and "use" of
famous marks. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed one of those deci-
sions in an important opinion on the scope of "dilution" in the Internet
domain name content.
On September 3, 1996, Toeppen was first preliminarily enjoined
from using the AMERICAN STANDARD trademark and the
<americanstandard.com> domain name and was ordered to transfer the
domain name to the plaintiff, American Standard, Inc., for the pendency
of the action." The case has been dismissed, and American Standard
continues to use the domain to promote its air conditioning, automotive,
medical systems and plumbing businesses.
Toeppen lost again in federal court a few months later.r The plain-
tiff, Intermatic, Inc., which had used its INTERMATIC trade name and
mark in connection with its electronics business since 1941, sued Toep-
pen, who had registered the domain name <intermatic.com>, for
dilution and trademark infringement. On Intermatic's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court ruled against Toeppen, holding that Toeppen's
registration and use of the <intermatic.com> domain name constituted
dilution of a famous mark. The court held that obtaining a domain name
78. See Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Or.
1997).
79. Id. at 1332.
80. See id. at 1336.
81. See American Standard, Inc. v. Toeppen, No. 96 CV 2147, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14451, at *1 (C.D. 111. Sept. 3, 1996).
82. See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F.Supp. 1227 (N.D. II. 1996).
Trademark Issues in Cyberspace
with the intent to "arbitrage" the name represented a commercial use,
and that its effect was to dilute the mark within the meaning of the new
Federal Trademark Dilution Act.8" The court further held that questions
of fact on the issue of likelihood of confusion prevented it from reach-
ing summary judgment on Intermatic's claim of trademark
infringement.
Toeppen suffered his third loss in court against plaintiff Panavision
International, the well-known Hollywood camera and lens maker that
distributes its motion picture equipment under the familiar
PANAVISION and PANAFLEX marks. Following the reasoning of In-
termatic, the district court held Toeppen's registration and "use" of the
<Panavision.com> and <Panaflex.com> domain names constituted di-
lution." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment
against Toeppen, interpreting the "commercial use" and "dilution" ele-
ments of a federal antidilution claim in the Internet context. First,
apparently accepting that registration of a trademark as a domain name
without more does not constitute "commercial use," the appeals court
held that registration in order to prevent rightful trademark owners from
doing business on the Internet under their trademarks unless they paid
Toeppen's fee constituted commercial use of the marks." Second, fo-
cusing on the Act's definition of dilution at 15 U.S.C. §1127 ("the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services" [emphasis added]), the Ninth Circuit emphasized that
it need not rely on traditional notions of dilution such as "blurring" or
"tarnishment." Rather, since potential customers commonly try to find a
company on the Internet by using its famous mark to locate the com-
pany's web site, the court agreed with the Intermatic holding that
depriving a trademark owner of the power to use its mark as its domain
name "lessens the capacity of [the trademark owner] to identify and
distinguish its goods and services by means of the Internet."86
Contrary to Actmedia, which held that domain name registration of
a famous mark alone represented infringement, another federal court has
held more recently that registration of a domain name alone, without
use, does not constitute infringement or dilution. In Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., Lockheed sued NSI alleging trademark
infringement and dilution of its registered trademark SKUNK
83. See id. at 1239.
84. See Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D.Cal. 1996), affd
141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
85. See Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1326.
86. Id. at 1326 (citing Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F.Supp. at 1240) The Panavision
decision is also noteworthy for affirming the Central District of California court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Toeppen, an nlinois resident, as discussed infra in section II.B.
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WORKS." Specifically, Lockheed alleged that by awarding registra-
tions of the domain names <skunkworks.com>, <skunkworks.net>,
<skunkwrks.com>, and <skunkwerks.com> to multiple parties other
than Lockheed, NSI had infringed and caused dilution of Lockheed's
mark. NSI moved to dismiss on the grounds that the registrants of each
of these domains were indispensable parties to the suit which Lockheed
had failed to join. The Central District of California district court denied
NSI's motion, finding that these parties were potential joint tortfeasors
along with NSI, and as such, these parties were "permissive" rather than
indispensable parties to the suit. In reaching its conclusion, however, the
court commented that it seemed "unlikely" that NSI's registration of
SKUNK WORKS type domain names would, by itself, violate the Lan-
ham Act.8"
The court later granted NSI's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that NSI has not made a commercial use of domain names as
trademarks, and therefore could not satisfy the commercial use element
of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).89 The court further concluded NSI was not liable
for contributory infringement because the knowledge requirement was
not satisfied, i.e., there was no evidence that NSI knew or had reason to
know of an infringing use of the domain name by the registrants.
In Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc. v. Bucci, use of
the domain in question, <plannedparenthood.com>, was beyond dispute,
but the character of that use was at issue. The defendant, Richard Bucci,
an anti-abortion activist and the host of a radio show called Catholic
Radio, obtained and used the domain at least in part to attract individu-
als who believed in abortion to his site. That site,
<www.plannedparenthood.com>, carried an opening banner that read
"Welcome to the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE" and
promoted an anti-abortion text called The Cost of Abortion.9 Planned
Parenthood, which owned incontestable registrations for the mark
PLANNED PARENTHOOD, and had used it in connection with its re-
productive health services for 50 years, brought suit for trademark
infringement and dilution under the Lanham Act.
Bucci first argued that there was no subject matter jurisdiction un-
der the Lanham Act, as his was non-commercial speech.' Noting that in
87. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
88. See Lockheed, 1997 WL 381967, at *1.
89. See Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 959.
90. See Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997).
91. See id. at *4.
92. See id. at *9.
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a prior hearing in the case the defendant had admitted that his use of the
plaintiff's mark was use in commerce as defined by the Act, the court
quickly rejected Bucci's attempted retrenchment. The court held that the
"in commerce" requirement was satisfied for two reasons. First, Bucci's
actions affected Planned Parenthood's ability to offer its health and in-
formation services which unquestionably were rendered in commerce.
Second, the fact an Internet site must be accessed via interstate tele-
phone lines means that putting up a home page, with unrestricted
access, satisfies the in commerce requirement of the Lanham Act.93 The
breadth of these conclusions, particularly the latter, likely will be scaled
back in future decisions.4
Finding subject matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act, the court
then found the commercial use requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1114
(infringement of a registered trademark), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (dilution),
and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (false designation of origin) were satis-
fied for three reasons: the defendant was promoting the sale of a book
(though he did not benefit monetarily from those sales), the defendant
solicited funds for his political activities, and the defendant's actions
harmed the plaintiff's ability to distribute its services by preventing
some Internet users from reaching the real Planned Parenthood site.95
In its discussion the court noted "whether defendant's use of the
mark is commercial within the meaning of the Lanham Act is a distinct
question from whether defendant's use of the mark is protected by the
First Amendment."96 However, after finding the use to be commercial,
and concluding that a likelihood of confusion exists, the court went on
to reject Bucci's First Amendment defense on the basis that the use be-
ing made was more as a source identifier than as part of the
"communicative message," the latter being protected speech, but the
former not."
The Second Circuit summarily affirmed the lower court.9 Beyond
the commercial speech issues, the case is of interest for the court's like-
lihood of confusion analysis as the court essentially eliminates two
prongs of the multi-factor Polaroid test as applied to disputes on the
Net. The court's conclusion that because both parties have web sites, the
93. See id. at *11.
94. But see Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, No. CIV. A. 98-274 (AJL), 1998 WL 111676
(D.N.J. Mar. 6, 1998).
95. See Planned Parenthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *13-*16, *22.
96. Id. at *21.
97. See id. at *37.
98. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America v. Bucci, No. 97-7492, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1998).
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parties' goods and services are in close proximity to each other" would,
taken to its logical conclusion, significantly eliminate this factor of
likelihood of confusion analysis whenever adverse parties have web
sites on which the marks/names in question appear. Likewise, conclud-
ing that the bridging the gap factor need not be considered because both
parties have web sites"° , overlooks the substantive aspect of this factor
and attributes too much to the "market" of the web. Again, this ap-
proach proves too much: one could just as easily conclude that bridging
the gap is an unnecessary inquiry between two companies engaged in
national distribution of their respective products because they are both
in the U.S. market. While the court reached the right result on both of
these prongs of the likelihood of confusion test, it did so for the wrong
reasons- reasons which may continue to reverberate in Internet case law
for some time.
Finally, in another recent domain name decision, Cardservice Int'l,
Inc. v. McGee,' the court found infringement of the plaintiff's regis-
tered CARDSERVICE INTERNATIONAL mark for credit card and
debit card processing and related services. The defendant, Webster
McGee, had registered the domain <cardservice.com> and set up a web
site advertising credit card processing services using the name "EMS-
Card Service on the Caprock." McGee claimed that he was not violating
the plaintiff's mark because his business name used the words "card"
and "service" separated by a space; the space was omitted only from the
domain name, and only because spaces are not permitted by Internet
protocol. However, the plaintiff submitted evidence showing that
McGee intended to use "guerrilla warfare" on the Internet against Card-
service International, that he had also registered <csimall.com> (the
"csi" having been derived from the plaintiffs trademark), and that he
was using the web sites to direct users to the plaintiffs competitors.' 2
The court, characterizing McGee's behavior as "malicious," issued a
permanent injunction against him and ordered him to pay the plaintiff s
attorneys fees."°
2. Non-U.S. Courts
Although domain name disputes, particularly those surrounding the
.com TLD, are often perceived as involving U.S. interests only, courts
99. See Planned Parenthood, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *26.
100. See id.
101. See Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997).
102. See id. at 738-39.
103. See id. at 743.
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throughout the world are now deciding trademark cases involving do-
main names
a. Britain
The Prince case"4 appears to be the first domain name dispute to in-
volve parties and courts in two different countries. The case revolves
around the <prince.con> domain which Prince PLC, a British computer
services company, obtained via NSI in February 1995. Prince PLC also
obtained the domain <prince.co.uk>. When Prince Sports Group, Inc., a
U.S. manufacturer of tennis rackets and other sporting goods, tried to reg-
ister the <prince.con> domain, it learned from NSI that the name was
already taken. Prince Sports Group registered several other domain names
instead, including <princetennis.com> and <princesportsgroup.com>, but
the U.S. company also launched an effort to obtain <prince.con> from
Prince PLC.
In order to trigger NSI's dispute policy, Prince Sports Group-
which has several trademark registrations for PRINCE in both the U.S.
and the UK-sent a demand letter to Prince PLC in the UK. The letter
threatened litigation if the British company did not assign the
<prince.com> domain to Prince Sports Group and agree not to use
PRINCE as any part of any new domain name they may select. Prince
PLC does not own a trademark registration for its PRINCE service mark
in the UK or elsewhere.
Prince Sports Group then initiated a domain name dispute with NSI,
enclosing a copy of its demand letter to Prince PLC along with copies of
its valid preexisting U.S. trademark registrations. Under the provisions
of NSI's dispute policy, Prince PLC was given 30 days to either relin-
quish the <prince.con> domain, produce a valid preexisting trademark
registration, file a legal action "in any court of competent jurisdiction in
the United States," or do nothing and have its domain put on hold.
With only one day remaining before <prince.con> would be put on
hold, Prince PLC opted not to comply with NSI's dispute policy and
instead filed a civil action against Prince Sports Group in the High
Court in London pursuant to section 21 of the UK Trade Marks Act of
1994.05 Prince PLC sought declarations from the UK court that its reg-
istration of the <prince.conr> domain did not infringe Prince Sports
Group's trademark rights and that Prince Sports Group's allegation of
infringement and threats of legal action were unjustified, and sought to
enjoin Prince Sports Group from continuing to threaten legal action
104. See Prince PLC v. Prince Sports Group, Inc. [1998] F.S.R. 21 (Ch. 1997).
105. See id. at 3.
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based on Prince PLC's use of the <prince.com> domain.' Despite the
fact that Prince PLC had not satisfied the requirements of NSI's dispute
policy, NSI nonetheless did not put the <prince.com> domain on hold
but instead deposited it with the UK court for disposition. 7
While the British case was pending, Prince Sports Group sued both
NSI and Prince PLC in U.S. federal court."' On July 31, 1997, the UK
court ruled that Prince Sports Group's threats were unjustified and is-
sued an injunction preventing the U.S. company from repeating its
threats. However, the UK court would not go so far as to declare that
Prince PLC's use of the <prince.com> domain name did not infringe
Prince Sports Group's registered UK trademarks.' ° The UK court stated
that it declined to get involved in the legal battle over domain name
ownership because it might be construed as undue interference in the
U.S. lawsuit filed by Prince Sports Group."0 The ruling left Prince PLC
in control of the domain and the case subsequently settled with Prince
Sports Group dropping its U.S. lawsuit and Prince PLC retaining owner-
ship of the domain. "
On the cybersquatting front, in Marks & Spencer PLC v. One in a
Million,112 the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, recently en-
joined the activities of two cyber-dealers and their related companies,
who had obtained and were offering for sale or "hire" numerous domain
names containing well known marks, such as burgerking.co.uk, mo-
torola.co.uk, britishtelecom.co.uk, spice-girls.net and virgin.org. In this
group of cases, the court enjoined the "threat of passing off' (a threat
which would become a reality if an offending domain was sold to and
used by a stranger to the trademark owner), issuing a warning to cyber-
squatters:
Any person who deliberately registers a domain name on ac-
count of its similarity to the name, brand name or trademark of
106. See id. at 8. Unlike in the U.S. where 'cease and desist' letters threatening legal
action for trademark infringement are commonplace, the UK Trade Marks Act makes it un-
lawful for the owner of a UK trademark registration to make unjustifiable threats of legal
proceedings for such infringement. Section 21 of the law provides for declaratory and in-
junctive relief as well as damages for those harmed by such threats. Trade Mark Act, 1994,
ch. 26, § 21 (Eng.).
107. See id. at 3.
108. See Special Report-Internet and Intranet: Why Princes Went to War Over the
Name of Their Domain, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 10, 1998, at 7.
109. See Prince PLC v. Prince Sports Group, Inc. [1998] F.S.R. 21 at 5 (Ch. 1997).
110. The UK court commented in denying Prince PLC's request that it was unclear for
what purpose this further declaration was being sought other than to provide Prince PLC
with leverage in the U.S. lawsuit. See Id. at 27.
111. See Prince PLC v. Prince Sports Group, Inc. [1998] F.S.R. 21 (Ch. 1997).
112. See Marks & Spencer PLC v. One in a Million, [1998] F.S.R. 265 (Ch. 1997).
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an unconnected commercial organization must expect to find
himself on the receiving end of an injunction to restrain the
threat of passing off, and the injunction will be in terms which
will make the name commercially useless to the dealer."3
In addition to the threat of passing off, the court also based its "final
injunctions" on grounds of trademark infringement, concluding that the
defendants' activities were inherently likely to confuse."'
The One in a Million case was preceded by one involving Harrods,
the internationally known department store, and the domain
<harrods.com>.'15 Although the Chancery Division of the High Court of
Justice declined to reach final judgment on the merits, the court en-
joined the domain holder, UK Network Services Limited, an Internet
service provider, and other defendants from infringing the Harrods
name and mark and ordered release of the <harrods.com> domain name.
116
United Kingdom courts have also created legal precedent involving
".co.uk" domains (".uk" is the ISO country code TLD for the United
Kingdom, and ".co" is used to demonstrate commercial entities, similar
to the .com TLD in the U.S.). "' In a case involving the name
<pitman.co.uk>, the court ruled that anyone may obtain a domain name
that has not already been assigned to another party."8 The
<pitman.co.uk> domain was initially assigned to Pearson Professional
Limited ("Pearson") on February 16, 1996, though Pearson did not be-
gin using the domain immediately. On March 31, 1996, another
company, PTC, obtained the domain name via an agent and began to use
it for e-mail purposes. At Pearson's request, the registry, Nominet UK,
returned the domain name to Pearson in accordance with Nominet UK's
"first come, first served" rule, cutting off PTC's e-mail. PTC sued. On
May 22, 1997, the court reaffirmed the "first come, first served" princi-
ple and Pearson's right to the domain name.
b. Germany
Outside the United States, German courts appear to have taken the
lead in deciding domain name disputes. In the first and most well-known
113. Id. at8.
114. Id. at 9.
115. See Michael Lindsey, Whose Name Is It Anyway, M2 PRESWIRE, Mar. 12, 1997.
116. Harrods Ltd. v. UK Network Services Ltd., 1996 H 5453. Justice Lightman pre-
siding, ordered December 9, 1996.
117. See Bina Cunningham, UK Courts Address Domain Name Issues (visited Apr. 14,
1999) <http://www.ljx.com/internet/01-98ukdom.html>.
118. See Pitman Training Ltd. v. Nominet UK, [1997] F. 1984 (Ch.).
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case, a court in Mannheim held that the assignment of the domain name
<heidelberg.de> to a private party ("de" is the ISO country code TLD
for Germany) infringed the City of Heidelberg's superior rights."9 The
city of Kerpen appears not to have faired as well in a dispute over
<kerpen.de>, where the K61n court ruled that the domain does not rep-
resent usage of the name of the city.' 20
Two other cases highlight the fact that, under German law, any activ-
ity on the Internet that is visible in Germany brings the actor under the
jurisdiction of the German courts. A court in Berlin recently enjoined use
by MCN, a Kansas City web design, Internet service, and domain name
brokerage firm, of <concertconcept.com>, <concertconcept.de>,
<concert-concept.con>, and <concert-concept.de>, as violating the rights
of a German company in its trade name and mark. 2' The court specifi-
cally noted that it is irrelevant to German jurisdiction whether the
defendant's host computer was in the U.S. or whether the domain was
registered in the U.S.-the only relevant criteria is that the web site can
be read in the district of the court.
A Dusseldorf court reached the same conclusion, albeit in dicta, in a
dispute involving the domain <epson.de>. In ordering removal of the
defendant's domain registration, the court offered that it makes no dif-
ference whether the TLD is .com or .de, so long as the web site with
which the domain is used is visible in Germany.'2
c. Netherlands
The courts in the Netherlands have decided several cases concern-
ing domain name disputes. Perhaps the most interesting involved a
group of banks and insurance companies, who together sued IMG Hol-
land N.V., a stock brokerage."a2 The brokerage obtained each plaintiff
company's name as an SLD in the .com TLD space-for example
119. Landgericht Mannheim, March 8, 1996,7-0-60/96.
120. Landgericht K61n, December 17, 1996,30 477/96. There appear to be other cases
on this theme: one involving the domain <braunschweig.de> (Landgericht Braunschweig,
January 28, 1997, 9 0 450/96), and another involving <cella.com> (OLG Celle, March 21,
1997, 13 U 202/96).
121. Landgericht Berlin, November 20, 1996, 5 U 659/97, 97 0 193/96 (upheld on ap-
peal March 25, 1997).
122. Landgericht Dusseldorf, April 4, 1997, 34 0 191/96. Other decisions in Germany
include: <huerth.de>: Landgericht K6i1n, December 17, 1996, 3 0 478/96; <pulheim.de>:
Landgericht K6ln, December 17, 1996, 3 0 507/96; <celle.de>: Landgericht Lilneburg,
January 29, 1997, 2 0 336/96; <wirtschaft-online.de>: OLG Frankfurt a.M., February 13,
1997, 6 W 5/97; <auv.de>: Landgericht Frankfurt, May 28, 1997, 2-6 0 125/97; <das.de>:
Landgericht Frankfurt, February 26, 1997 (3.3.97), 2/06 0 633/96 <krupp.de>: Landgericht
Bochum, April 24, 1997; <lego.de>, and <juris.de>.
123. Labouchere et al. v. IMG Holland, President District Court Amsterdam, May 15,
1997, Rechtspraak van de Week 1997, n. 193.
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<labouchre.com>-and used each of the domains as addresses for a
single web site containing information relevant to the plaintiffs' activi-
ties. 4 On May 15, 1997, the District Court at Amsterdam granted an
injunction against IMG's continued use of the domains, and found
IMG's conduct in obtaining the domains to be tortious, concluding that
despite the fact that the site itself disclosed that the information it con-
tained originated from IMG, consumers were likely to assume the
information came from the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were precluded
from establishing their own web sites under their own names. In so rul-
ing, the court rejected IMG's argument that the plaintiffs were not
harmed because they could obtain the identical SLDs in the .nl ISO
country code TLD, concluding that was insufficient consolation for the
plaintiffs because .com is the most common TLD for international
commerce.
d. Australia
The Australian courts may get an opportunity to hear a dispute re-
garding the domain name <sydney2000.net>. This domain has been
registered by an Australian Internet service provider, Asia Pacific Inter-
net Company ("APIC"). The Sydney Organising Committee for the
2000 Olympic Games (SOCOG) has sent a cease and desist letter, and
may soon take APIC to court. Commercial use of the phrase "SYDNEY
2000" is expressly prohibited by Australia's Sydney 2000 Games Indi-
cia and Images Protection Act 199622'
These cases raise national and international issues of trademark law
in the context of domain name disputes. As the domain name system
continues to evolve and electronic commerce continues to grow, more
and more courts throughout the world will be called on to resolve these
issues.
Ill. OTHER TRADEMARK ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE
Beyond domain name problems, trademark issues pop up in a vari-
ety of forms in cyberspace. Some are "garden variety" trademark
infringements; while the medium may have changed, the legal analysis
124. The other domains in question were: <banklabrouchere.com>,
<banklabouchere.com>, <snsbank.com>, <staalbankiers.com>, <deltalloyd.com>,
<ohra.com> and <vsbbank.com>. The plaintiff banks (individually) own the trade
names/services marks LABOURCHERE, BANKLABOURCHERE, SNSBANK,
STAALBANKIERS and VSB. The plaintiff insurance companies (individually) own the
service marks DELTALLOYD and OHRA.
125. Sydney 2000 Games (Indicia and Images) Protection Act, 1996 no. 22 (Asfl.).
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has remained virtually unaltered. At the same time, however, the web's
commercial explosion has presented trademark holders and the courts
with some difficult new issues. For example, as discussed below, the
technological ability to create hypertext links from one web site to oth-
ers and to imbed hidden code called Meta tags in web pages that,
although not viewable on the site, can be recognized by Internet search
engines, poses novel questions of trademark and unfair competition law
(not to mention copyright). Simultaneously, the lack of geographical
limits on the Internet has spawned a host of cases regarding jurisdiction.
The Internet has also generated some of the first test cases for the new
federal anti-dilution statute.
A. Linking and Framing
One of the most significant technical features that distinguishes the
Internet from all other communications media is the ability to dynami-
cally connect multiple documents and elements. These dynamic
connections most often appear in the form of "links" or "frames." It is
important to understand the nature of links and frames to understand the
context in which they can pose trademark concerns.
Linking comes in two forms. When a net user clicks on an icon or
highlighted text segment programmed as a hypertext reference link, the
link instantly transports the user to another location. The link may lead
simply to a particular point within the same web site, but, just as often,
the link allows the user to leap from one site to a completely different,
unrelated site provided by a different source, across the country or
across the world. This latter form of linking, called "linking out," is
what most people mean when they speak of linking. If the user checks
the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) address on the browser being
used, the address will change from the page where the user started to
that of the linked page. In contrast to hypertext reference links, image
links bring an image contained in a separate file onto the page being
viewed. The separate file may be an image file stored on the same
server as the link or an image file stored on a separate, unrelated site,
which is known as "linking in." For example, a travel agency advertis-
ing trips to Hawaii might link in photographs from hotel, airline, and
resort sites to promote bookings. The end result is a web page that ap-
pears to be a seamless integration of content and images all provided by
the same source.
Framing is another type of dynamic connection that is similar to im-
age linking, but that permits more sophisticated "capture" of content. A
framing site brings entire web pages from another site into a window on
the original site. Using framing technology a web developer can allow
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users to scroll through multiple sites simultaneously. For example, our
travel agent might have a page that shows an airline's page in a left
hand column window. In the right hand window, the content of the web
sites of various destination resorts would display in cycles, that is, a new
page, and new resort, would appear every five minutes. Across the bot-
tom of the screen the travel agency might have a ledge, that is, a portion
of the screen that does not change so long as the user is at the travel
agency's site. The ledge might contain the agency's logos, links for
navigating within the agency's site, and advertisements from sponsors.
With both image links and framing, the URL does not change,
which may give the impression that the site on which the link is located
is an authorized provider of the linked or framed content. To prevent
access to image files, web site owners can limit access to the files so
that only requests to link from authorized pages are allowed. To prevent
a site from being framed, developers add an instruction to the page's
source code so that when the user clicks the link to the page a new win-
dow is opened so that the page appears in its own window without the
linked page's frame around it.
The ability to direct users from one site to another using hypertext
reference links underpins Internet commerce. Although under some cir-
cumstances a party linking to or framing another's site may seek
permission, doing so is not the norm. Content providers have been less
receptive to framing and image links than they have to hypertext refer-
ence links, for which permission to link historically has been regarded
as unnecessary.
The first major case to challenge framing on intellectual property
theories has settled. In Washington Post Co. v. TotalNews,126 Total-
NEWS provided a web site that featured a list of "name-brand" news
services, identified by their trademarks, in a narrow column to the left,
an advertising banner across the bottom right of the screen, and a con-
tent window in the upper right of the screen. When a user clicked on a
news service, that news service's content appeared within the content
window on the TotalNEWS web site. However, when the news service's
content first loaded, its advertisements were obscured by the advertising
banner on the TotalNEWS web site. Some of the framed sites, such as
CNN Interactive, responded by setting their pages to refresh when
loaded so that the pages appeared in their own window without the To-
talNEWS frame.
Although substantially a copyright case, the TotalNews plaintiffs
(The Washington Post, Time, CNN, The Los Angeles Times, Dow
126. See Washington Post Co. v. TotalNews, No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
20, 1997) (complaint).
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Jones and Co., and Reuters) also alleged trademark infringement, false
designation of origin, and unfair competition. On June 5, 1997, the
parties settled with TotalNEWS agreeing to cease framing the plaintiffs'
web sites in exchange for permission to link to the plaintiffs' web sites
using hypertext reference links consisting only of highlighted plain
text. 27 Each plaintiff is entitled to revoke permission to link to its site;
however, if the defendant refuses to remove the link the plaintiff must
convince a court that the link is an impermissible violation of rights un-
der some theory of intellectual property.
A more recent case involving framing, based substantially on copy-
right claims, has not settled, and has already generated two opinions.2'
Defendant Applied Anagramics is the owner of the "1-800-DENTIST"
trademark, and exclusively licensed it to plaintiff Futuredontics. Evi-
dently still desiring some credit or benefit relating to the mark,
Anagramics created a web site that displayed the mark by framing Fu-
turedontics' site. Futuredontics has sued for copyright infringement,
alleging that defendants had created an unauthorized derivative work
within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and alleging a false advertis-
ing claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, arising out of certain
representations made by Applied Anagramics.
The district court's two opinions seemingly point in different direc-
tions and illuminate little. On the one hand, the court denied plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction on the ground plaintiff had not shown
a likelihood of success on merits; on the other hand, the court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that defendants had failed
to show that plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of
facts that could be proved.
Although the Futuredontics case does liot illustrate this point, the
TotalNews case demonstrates an important distinction between framing
and linking in the context of advertising, the lifeblood of the web. With
framing, the framing site's revenue generating advertisements are sub-
stantially more visible to the consumer than those of the framed site.
Unlike the TotalNEWS style framing model, the hypertext reference
127. See Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y.
June 6, 1997) (stipulation and order of settlement and dismissal); Parties Settle Total News
'Framing' Suit: Framing Halted, Hyperlinks Will be Text-Only, 2 ELECTRONIC POL'Y & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 612-13 (June 13, 1997) (summarizing litigation and settlement
agreement).
128. See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22249 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 2, 1997) (denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment)
aff'd 1998 WL 417413 (9th Cir. July 23, 1998); Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics,
Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2265 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1998) (denying defendant's motion to
dismiss).
Trademark Issues in Cyberspace
linking model, permitted under the terms of the settlement, does not ob-
scure the advertisements of the linked page. Where sites are linked,
rather than framed, the link can enhance the revenues of both sites, pro-
viding additional consumers through links. Such economic benefits of
linking, as well as the fair use nature of many such links, have caused
linking to become ubiquitous on the net.
However, not everyone accepts the theory that hypertext reference
links are beneficial, or at least harmless. On April 28, 1997, Ticketmas-
ter filed a complaint against Microsoft in federal district court in Los
Angeles alleging that Microsoft's unauthorized links to interior pages of
Ticketmaster's site constitute "electronic piracy," and accusing Micro-
soft of "feathering its own nest at Ticketmaster's expense."'2'9
In the complaint, Ticketmaster indirectly alleges that Microsoft's
Seattle Sidewalk city guide at <www.seattle.sidewalk.com>, a feature of
the Microsoft Network, wrongfully linked users in search of tickets to
Seattle-area sports and entertainment events directly to the page of the
Ticketmaster site where such tickets could be ordered. The complaint
states several counts, including trademark infringement, dilution, and
federal and state unfair competition claims, all of which are primarily
premised on a theory of web site dilution-likely the first of its kind.
Pursuing an argument that would allow it to direct the flow of traffic
into and within its web site, Ticketmaster essentially equates a web site
with a trademark, claiming that is has an obligation to control "the man-
ner in which others utilize and profit from its proprietary services, or
face the prospect of a feeding frenzy diluting its content."'130 After filing
the suit, a Ticketmaster representative commented to the press that
Ticketmaster's concern was not Microsoft's links to the Ticketmaster
home page (<www.ticketmaster.com>), but Microsoft's direct links to
specific parts of the Ticketmaster site that allowed a ticket customer to
bypass the home page. Not surprisingly, the Ticketmaster home page
contains advertising (in addition to other content) that was bypassed by
a link, such as Microsoft's, to an internal page within the site. Signifi-
cantly, shortly before the suit was filed Ticketmaster and Microsoft ended
efforts to negotiate a partnership in which they would jointly provide a
city events guide and ticketing service; Ticketmaster announced that it
would offer its service in collaboration with City Search, another guide
service.13' Not surprisingly, Microsoft answered, denying the claims and
129. Complaint, Ticketmaster v. Microsoft, 97 Civ. 3055 at 6 (C.D. Cal. April 28,
1997), reprinted in Ticketmaster v. Microsoft (visited Apr. 18, 1999) <http://www.jmls.edu/
cyber/cases/ticketl.html>.
130. Id.
131. See Ticketmaster Goes Local (Aug. 13, 1998) <http://www.cnnfn.com/
hotstoriesldealsI9808113/ticketmaster/>.
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asserting affirmative defenses such as fair use, 2 non-commercial use,
estoppel, assumption of risk and First Amendment protection.
Ultimately, if a court were to find Microsoft liable for the mere act
of linking, the decision would have profound repercussions for all Inter-
net users. It is likely that, if a court ultimately finds any liability at all,
the decision will be quite narrow and limited to the particular facts of
the case. But even if the case should settle, the issue will continue to
resurface in the context of linking that results in diverting advertising
revenues. 133 For example, one meta-search engine provides the results of
other search engines, such as Excite or Infoseek, and attribute the con-
tent to the source engine, but without the logos, features, or advertising
of the source engine. In place of other search engines' advertising, the
meta-search engine may sell advertising on its site."3 If meta-search en-
gines like this become popular and reduce the number of direct searches
on the source engines, thus reducing advertising revenues, the source
engines may sue on theories similar to those in Ticketmaster.
As is evident in Ticketmaster, linking highlights another complica-
tion which may be unique to the net: the ability of friend or foe to divert
traffic from a trademark owner's web site, likely the intended site, to the
proponent or opponent's site. The vast majority of search engines avail-
able on the web today report search results based on raw number of
hits-the number of times the searched-for term appears on the web
page. A detractor may deliberately overwhelm the trademark owner's
presence on the web, or a supporter may unwittingly do so, thereby di-
verting traffic away from the trademark owner's site.
A more sinister development involves the wholesale appropriation
of the content of sites that receive a high numbers of hits. The appro-
priator downloads the content of a site that receives a substantial
number of hits, for example <disney.conr>, and then converts all text
and images to white on white so that it becomes hidden. This hidden
132. Significantly, Microsoft has used textual links only; Microsoft has not reproduced
the Ticketmaster logo. Microsoft is likely to argue that it made no more use of Ticketmas-
ter's intellectual property than necessary in providing Seattle Sidewalk customers with
ticketing information. See New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971
F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth a three part 'nominal fair-use' test where a commer-
cial defendant uses the plaintiff's mark in describing the defendant's product or service: 1)
the defendant's product or service is not readily identifiable without use of the mark; 2) only
so much of the mark as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service is used; and
3) the user does nothing with the mark that suggests sponsorship or endorsement by the
trademark holder). At least as an equitable matter, Microsoft undoubtedly also will argue
that Ticketmaster is not harmed but actually benefits from the increased traffic to its site.
133. Other contexts in which a link may be unappreciated include links to a porno-
graphic site.
134. See, e.g., Netscape Netcenter <http://home.netscape.com> (visited Jan. 25, 1998).
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content is then made part of the appropriator's site, which, for example,
may be a competing site selling videotapes of children's movies. When
an Internet user searches for content that appears on the appropriated
site, for example "Hercules," the search engine will return both the
Disney site and the competing site, because both sites contain the same
content, even though the user cannot see the appropriated site's content
on the competing site. While such appropriation is a copyright violation,
it may also qualify as unfair competition or trademark dilution.
A related problem involves use of corporate logos by disgruntled
former employees. In several instances, unhappy former employees
have set up web pages, complete with doctored versions of their target's
marks, to rail against the injustices allegedly visited upon them by their
former employer. The same may be true of consumers displeased with
"lemon" purchases, and virtually anyone else with an ax to grind. While
each of these avenues of complaint has been available through more
traditional forms of media in the past, the opportunity to reach a broader
audience, cheaply, and to flaunt corporate logos and marks in the proc-
ess, is increased dramatically on the net.
Attempted enforcement of trademark rights against persons who use
marks or content to divert traffic from a trademark owner's site,
whether the troublesome use is by friend or foe, requires careful consid-
eration of First Amendment concerns as well as of trademark principles
of fair use. The public relations nightmare that could result from a mis-
step in this area should be balanced against both the perceived need to
police trademark rights and the proposed policing method.
In Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc.,'35 the court
was unwilling to extend trademark protection in a domain name dispute
that focused on the path of the URL (as opposed to the use of someone
else's registered mark). The path is that part of the web site address that
immediately follows the forward slash after the domain name (e.g.,
"volfive/abel.html" in <www.mttlr.org/vofive/abel.html>). Reasoning
that the path merely shows how the web site's data is organized within
the host computer, and does not serve the same source identifying func-
tion as the domain name, 'the court held it does not merit the same
protection. The court noted, "[plaintiff] has cited no case in which the
use of a trademark within the path of the URL formed the basis of a
trademark violation."'
136
135. See Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. 96-2703 TEH, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20877 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 29, 1997).
136. Id. at *13, note 6.
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B. Meta Tagging
While some appropriators steal content simply to ensure that their
site appears in search engine results, even if the searcher was not
searching for their product or service, other means to accomplish the
same result exist. Meta tagging is a technique whereby a word (e.g.
"sex") is inserted in the keywords field of the site in order to increase
the chances of a search engine returning the site, although the site may
have nothing to do with the inserted word. In another version of this
technique, a pornographic site duplicates, in their keywords field, the
keywords of frequently searched sites so that the pornographic site will
be returned by search engine looking for the frequently searched site.
In what appears to be the first case of this type, the law firm of
Oppedahl & Larson, owner of the domain name <patents.com>, filed a
trademark infringement action against three companies and the corre-
sponding ISPs after discovering that the companies inserted the words
"Oppedahl" and "Larson" in the keywords field of their web pages in
order to draw traffic to their sites. When the law firm ran a search on
"Oppedahl" and "Larson," the defendants' web sites were returned but
the sites did not appear to contain either term. Only a review of the
source page revealed the hidden text.
37
It is anticipated that all the defendants will defend their actions on
fair use and First Amendment grounds. However, to the extent such ac-
tions cause confusion, or are used to intentionally mis-direct potential
customers to a competitor's site, such actions may be found to consti-
tute trademark infringement or unfair competition. 38
A slight variation on this theme is Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Cal-
vin Designer Label,139 the first case in which a court enjoined a party
from using misleading terms in hidden text or metatags on a web site. In
this case, the defendants' web sites <playboyxxx.com> and
<playmatelive.com> featured adult material and nude photographs, ad-
vertised defendants' "Playmate Live Magazine" and displayed the
message "Get it all here @ Playboy."'" The defendant's sites also con-
137. See Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, Civ. Act. No. 97-Z-1592, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18359 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 1998), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23105 (D. Colo.
Dec. 19, 1997), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23108 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 1997).
138. A rather amusing footnote to this case can be found at <www.geocities.com>
which contains an entire page of statements disclaiming any connection, affiliation, sponsor-
ship of the site, or even information about Carl Oppedahl or Oppedahl & Larson, but which
also ensures the site will appear prominently in search engine results when the terms
'Oppedahl' or 'Larson' are input.
139. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D.
Cal. 1997). Calvin Designer Label has no relation to the fashion designer of the same name.
140. Id. at 1221.
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tained the terms PLAYBOY, PLAYBOY MAGAZINE and
PLAYMATE, repeated several hundred times. The terms were in black
type on a black background, so they were not visible to individuals
viewing the site but the words did cause the sites to be returned by
search engine queries for "Playboy" or "Playmate." In fact, given the
number of times the terms appeared, the sites were typically the first or
second sites to be returned, before the plaintiff's <playboy.com>.
When the defendants failed to respond to requests that they cease
using the marks, Playboy Enterprises (PEI) sued for, inter alia, trade-
mark infringement, dilution, and unfair competition and moved for
injunctive relief to preclude defendants from continuing to use the
marks in this fashion. The defendants failed to respond to the motion
and a preliminary injunction was issued on September 8, 1997 which
precluded the defendants from continuing to use the <playboyxxx.com>
and <playmatelive.com> domains or PEI's registered PLAYBOY and
PLAYMATE trademarks in hidden text or metatags on the defendants'
web site.' Interestingly, the preliminary injunction not only precluded
defendants from continuing to use the marks and domain names, it or-
dered defendants to immediately request that NSI cancel its domain
name registrations. Anticipating NSI's likely response, the court ordered
that, in the event NSI were to deposit the domain names with the court
for disposition, "the domain names are hereby canceled.'
42
In another case involving PEI, a federal district court ruled in favor
of a defendant, Terri Welles, who had included trademarked terms on
both the title and metatags of her website 4 1 Welles, who appeared in
Playboy magazine as a Playmate of the Month, and then Playmate of the
Year, established a website, <http://www.terriwelles.com>, which in-
cluded the heading "Terri Welles-Playmate of the Year 1981." Among
other uses of PEI's trademarks, the site also contained the terms
"Playboy" and "Playmate" within the keywords section of its meta-
tags.
144
The court held the use of the trademarked terms in metatags on Ms.
Welles' site did not constitute trademark infringement, since it qualified
for the "fair use" defense.' 45 Although the court briefly mentioned that
metatags are not visible to websurfers, it did not then proceed to carve
out the website's metatag as a specialized tool of trademark infringe-
ment. Instead, it compared metatags to the "subject index of a card
141. See id.
142. Id. at 1222.
143. See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
144. See id. at 1 101.
145. See id. at 1104.
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catalog," and held that there may be "legitimate editorial uses" of
trademarked terms in metatags which make it easier for websurfers to
know the content of a website. 146 "[The] defendant may properly use the
term Playboy in an editorial fashion ... Therefore, the court finds that
defendant has not infringed on defendant's trademarks by using them in
her website meta tags.
Ultimately, for infringement purposes, the court treated the
"invisible" metatags much like the "visible" webpage itself. Since Ms.
Welles was indeed a Playboy Playmate, her use of those terms to de-
scribe herself, whether visibly on her webpage or through metatags, was
a fair use.
C. Procedural Concerns: Jurisdiction
The instantaneous international nature of the web adds an element
of uncertainty to trademark use. For example, a client may put up a page
containing marks cleared for use in the U.S., perhaps even marks that
have long been in use in the U.S. market, and receive a cease and desist
demand from a company with trademark rights in Germany. Recently, a
German state trial court in Berlin enjoined the use of the domain names
"concertconcept.com," "concertconcept.de," "concert-concept.com,"
and "concert-concept.de" under German trademark law.48 The court
found jurisdiction over the defendant, a United States corporation doing
business in Kansas and Germany, on the grounds that the domain names
were accessible at the plaintiff's location in Germany. As for the claims
concerning the .com sites, which are registered in the U.S., the court
stated that the country within which the name had been registered was
irrelevant in determining jurisdiction.
This exercise of jurisdiction over a domain name dispute on the ba-
sis of accessibility of a foreign registered site within the forum country
goes beyond the most expansive extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction
occurring to date within the U.S. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuck-
leberry Publishing, Inc.,49 the district court found that it had jurisdiction
over the operators of the Italian web site "playmen.it." The service al-
lowed users to download information from the Italian PLAYMEN
magazine and specifically courted U.S. users. Although this extra-
territorial exercise of jurisdiction appears expansive, the court deter-
mined it had jurisdiction based on retention of jurisdiction over the
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See text and accompanying footnotes, supra, Section I.E.2.
149. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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defendant for the purposes of enforcing a permanent injunction issued in
1981. The court ruled that the operators must either completely shut
down the site or prevent U.S. users from accessing the Italian site.
In numerous cases involving trademarks or other content on the In-
ternet, the first issue the court confronts is jurisdiction. Most
problematic is applying traditional principles of jurisdiction, which
speak in terms of a party's establishment of minimum contacts with a
state or a federal judicial district, to the Internet, an instrumentality that
is global in scope."
The Sixth Circuit first addressed the issue of jurisdiction in an ac-
tion brought by CompuServe in federal district court in Ohio against
one of CompuServe's Texas subscribers, who also sold software known
as "shareware" on the CompuServe system in CompuServe, Inc. v. Pat-
terson.5' After Patterson alleged that CompuServe was infringing his
copyright and trademarks in his Internet browser software, CompuServe
sued for declaratory judgment. To establish personal jurisdiction over
Patterson, CompuServe introduced the following facts: as a shareware
provider, Patterson entered into an online subscription agreement as
well as a separate online shareware agreement with CompuServe. Both
agreements provided that they are entered into in and governed by the
laws of Ohio. From his residence in Texas, Patterson electronically as-
sented to these terms. Patterson advertised and made his shareware
programs available to buyers using CompuServe's servers, which are
located in Ohio. Finally, Patterson actually sold some of his software to
twelve Ohio residents through CompuServe. Unconvinced, the district
court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and CompuServe ap-
pealed.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Patterson's contacts with
Ohio, even though they were primarily electronic, exceeded the consti-
tutional minimum for jurisdiction, and made clear that Patterson had
purposefully established an ongoing business relationship in Ohio.5
Although the Sixth Circuit was willing to find this combination of con-
tacts sufficient to satisfy minimum contacts, the court noted that it was
questionable as to whether either entering an electronic contract or
placing products into the electronic stream of commerce on their own
would support exercising jurisdiction.
150. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law Without Borders-The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. Rnv. 1367 (1996). See also U.S. v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th
Cir. 1996).
151. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
152. See id. at 1266.
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Most courts presented with a defendant who has actively maintained
a web site and advertised services over the net combined with an action
with some direct effect in the forum state, such as provision of services
to forum states customers or defamation directed at the forum state,
have found a sufficient basis to exercise jurisdiction.'53 Courts have been
invited to expand personal jurisdiction most broadly in cases alleging
trademark infringement. In these cases the primary contact consists of
the web site alone, without much more. Federal district courts in New
York have declined the invitation thus far to interpret New York's long-
arm statute broadly. However, courts in states with less restrictive long-
arm statutes have been willing to find that a web site, combined with the
merest hint of an effect or second contact, sufficed to establish personal
jurisdiction within the constraints of due process.
In the first New York case, Bensusan Restaurant Corp., the owner
of The Blue Note, a highly acclaimed New York jazz club and a feder-
ally registered trademark for THE BLUE NOTE, alleged that a web site
maintained by Missouri resident Richard King was infringing Bensu-
san's trademark rights.' King operated a small club in Missouri also
known as The Blue Note. In April of 1996, King posted a web site pro-
moting his club and offering information for ticket purchase by
telephone. Tickets had to be picked up at outlets located in Missouri.
The court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
court held that, under the New York long-arm jurisdiction statute, King
was not committing a tortious act in New York, because he was not of-
fering anything for sale in New York. Tickets to the Missouri Blue Note
could be picked up only in Missouri; they would not be mailed, nor
could they be ordered directly from King's web site. The court also
noted that King could not offer tickets for sale to a New Yorker unless
the New Yorker took affirmative steps to obtain access to the Internet,
and King's site specifically, before placing an order. On a separate
prong of the long-arm statute, the court found that even if King's activi-
153. See, e.g., Edias Software Int'l, LLC, v. Basis International Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413
(D. Ariz. 1996) (court had jurisdiction over non-Arizona defendant who had sent e-mail and
posted messages to a web site and interactive Internet forum announcing that it would no
longer use Arizona plaintiff as its software distributor); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation,
958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996) (court has jurisdiction over non-District of Columbia defen-
dant who used web site <heroes.org> and newspaper advertisement to solicit donations for
charitable service similar to District of Columbia plaintiffs HEROES charitable service; in
dicta the court stated that the web site activities alone would be an adequate basis for per-
sonal jurisdiction); Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119
(court has jurisdiction over non-Pennsylvania defendant Internet service provider who proc-
essed applications by Pennsylvania residents for service and issued passwords to those
residents).
154. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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ties were likely to cause consequences in New York, King did not de-
rive substantial revenue from interstate commerce, again falling short of
the statutory minimum to establish jurisdiction. The case was dismissed
on September 19, 1996.'
In the next case, Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 156 a district court held
that web sites are analogous to advertisements in national magazines,
which under New York law are insufficient on their own to confer juris-
diction. Further, the court analogized e-mails to letters or telephone
calls, which are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the New
York long-arm statute.
Several federal district courts outside of New York have been most
willing to infer sufficient contacts based on the existence of a web site
and scant more where the allegations involve trademark infringement. A
California court held that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over
well-known "cybersquatter" Dennis Toeppen, an Illinois resident who
specifically targeted his activities at a California-based entity, thus
causing requisite harm in California. 57 Following a thorough discussion
of the issue, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the personal jurisdiction holding
against Toeppen based on the "effects" doctrine. 56 As discussed previ-
ously, Toeppen sought to extract payment from Hollywood camera- and
lens-manufacturer Panavision International in exchange for releasing
the <panavision.com> and <panaflex.com> domain names to Panavi-
sion.
The Ninth Circuit held that by "engag[ing] in a scheme to register
[California-based] Panavision's trademarks as his domain names for the
purpose of extorting money from Panavision," Toeppen had done
something more than merely register someone else's trademark as a
domain name and posting a web site. "His conduct, as he knew it
likely would, had the effect of injuring Panavision in California," the
court observed. '5' In addition, Toeppen sent a letter to Panavision in
California demanding $13,000 to release his registration of
<Panavision.com>.' 6 Applying the "effects test" set out in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 6' the court had no difficulty concluding that
155. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp., 1196 U.S. App. LEXIS 24796 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
19, 1996).
156. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2065, at
*43 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
157. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621-622 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(denying motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
158. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320-22 (9th Cir. 1998).
159. Id. at 1323.
160. See id. at 1322, 1323.
161. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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Toeppen had purposeful availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in California and that the exercise of jurisdiction was consti-
tutional.
Similar reasoning was embraced by a district court in Missouri,
which found jurisdiction under the Missouri long-arm statute in Maritz,
Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.'62 The Missouri plaintiff offered e-mail sub-
scription advertising services under the GOLDMAIL mark. Defendant
CYBERGOLD advertised a similar service at its web site
<cybergold.com>. Reasoning that while the defendant's action in estab-
lishing the cybergold.com web site concededly occurred outside
Missouri, the intent to encourage all Internet users to sign on to the de-
fendant's mailing list provided sufficient contacts to establish personal
jurisdiction.
Likewise, a district court in Connecticut found sufficient minimum
contacts in an infringement case where the alleged contacts consisted of
a web site and a toll-free phone number.'63 In part, the Connecticut court
relied on the physical proximity of the forum state and the defendant's
state of residence, Massachusetts.
In all of these cases, the courts applied an established personal ju-
risdiction analysis. In evaluating minimum contacts, the courts treated
Internet and electronic contacts no differently from other business ac-
tivity. No federal court has accepted a plaintiff's invitation to expand
general jurisdiction, that is, where the contacts are unrelated to the cause
of action, to any defendant who merely advertises on a global computer
network.
16
162. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc, 947 F.Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
163. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996).
164. See IDS Life Insurance Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1268 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) ('it cannot plausibly be argued that any defendant who advertises nationally could
expect to be haled [sic] into court in any state, for a cause of action that does not relate to the
advertisements.'); McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. CIV 95-4037, 1996 WL
753991 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) ('allowing computer interaction via the Web to supply
sufficient contacts to establish [general] jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdic-
tion requirement as it currently exists'). See also, GenneX Corp. v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Massachusetts, No. 97C 1750 (N. Dist. Ill., Eastern Div., filed Mar. 14, 1997), and
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts v. GenneX Corp., et aL, No. 97 11174 MLW
(D. MA, filed May 23, 1997). Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts filed an objec-
tion with NSI to GenneX Corporations' use of the <healthwire.com> domain and GenneX
responded by filing a declaratory judgment action in the District Court in Illinois. GenneX
provides women's health information via its <healthwire.com> web site and also hosts home
pages of other individuals and organizations providing related information. Blue Cross uses
and owns a registration for the healthwire mark for its health care provider claims processing
system. Blue Cross moved to dismiss the Illinois action on the ground that the ability to
access its home page in llinois is not enough, by itself, to subject it to jurisdiction in that
court. Simultaneously, Blue Cross filed su it in Massachusetts and moved to enjoin GenneX's
continued use of the <healthwire.com> domain. GenneX opposed Blue Cross' preliminary
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Consistent with this line of reasoning, the Ninth Circuit held that the
mere posting to a web site that could be viewed in Arizona was an in-
sufficient basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction in Arizona over
a Florida-based defendant. 65 In Cybersell, the Florida Cybersell adver-
tised commercial services over the Internet via a 'passive' web site
6
and the Arizona Cybersell corporation, which also advertised services
on the web, brought suit for infringement. In considering the personal
jurisdiction issue, the court found the defendant-which neither specifi-
cally solicited Arizona customers nor had any other contact with the
state-had not purposefully availed itself of the forum state, thereby
"invoking the benefits and protections of Arizona."'67 Thus, it concluded
the exercise of personal jurisdiction here would not comport with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'' 8
An effects test, like that applied by the Panavision court, stretches a
court's jurisdictional reach under a minimum contacts analysis the fur-
thest. The Panavision court emphasized Toeppen's choice in targeting
the well-known trademarks of a California business and conducted no
analysis of Toeppen's Internet activity or even hits on his web site from
California. The Panavision court also had great temptation to expand its
jurisdiction, given that the defendant allegedly was a notorious domain
name pirate, and given the defendant's reportedly conceded intent to
extract money from a California-based company. As courts hear more
cases involving electronic commerce, the case law will continue to re-
flect the challenge of applying well-established jurisdictional doctrine to
a new global activity. 6 9
injunction motion also on jurisdictional grounds. Thus, each party was in the unenviable
position of arguing it should not be subjected to the jurisdiction of another party's home
courts based on the ability to access its web site there, but that the opposing party should be
subject to jurisdiction on this basis in its home state. This dispute settled after the Illinois
district court dismissed the action pending there for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Minute
Order of July 11, 1997 by Hon. Marvin E. Aspen.
165. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,419 (9th Cir. 1997).
166. A passive web site is one that affords no interaction by the user, and merely pro-
vides information (such as an advertisement).
167. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419.
168. Id. at 415 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
169. For other recent decisions regarding personal jurisdiction over defendants whose
conduct involved the Internet see, e.g., American Network, Inc. v. Access America, 975
F.Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Clipp Designs, Inc. v. Tag Bags, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 766 (E.D.
11. 1998); Haelan Prods. Inc. v. Beso Biological Research Inc., 1997 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 10565
(E.D. La. July 11, 1997)(as amended July 15, 1996); Telco Communications Group, Inc. v.
An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F.Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that jurisdiction was prop-
erly asserted); CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 965 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Tex. Filed May 9, 1997);
Expert Pages v. Buckalew, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12205 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997); SF Hotel
Co. v. Energy Investments, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997); Transcraft Corp. v.
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D. Dilution
The Internet has been a rich training ground for the application of
the new federal dilution statute. Dilution occurs when a trademark
owner's trademark, or a similar one, is used in such a way as to dilute-
and in some cases to tarnish-the distinctive quality of the mark. Unlike
an infringement claim, a dilution claim does not require the court to as-
sess whether consumers are likely to be confused into thinking there is
an association between the unauthorized use and the trademark owner.
Therefore, it is not necessary for the goods with which the marks are
used to be similar for a court to find that dilution is present.
On Januaryl6, 1996, federal dilution protection went into effect in
this country. 17 Prior to that time, dilution protection was only available
in some states, although courts often bent over backwards where dilu-
tion protection was not available to find liability under Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act (covering unfair competition) for particularly offensive
(typically sexually explicit) situations. 171
Not surprisingly, the first dilution case on the web involved two of
the hot issues on the web today: domain names and the availability of
sexually explicit materials. On February 9, 1996, the federal district
court in Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd. issued a
preliminary injunction precluding the defendant from continuing to use
the domain "candyland.com" as the domain/URL for its "Candyland"
web site featuring sexually explicit materials. 172
The court apparently was persuaded by evidence that 94% of U.S.
mothers are familiar with Hasbro's popular 47 year old CANDY LAND
game for young children that Hasbro was likely to be successful on its
federal dilution claim at a trial on the merits. 3 Beyond the offensive
nature of the content at the "candyland.com" web site, the court may
also have been troubled by the defendant's reservation of another do-
main, "parkerbrothers.com"-Parker Brothers being the name of a well
known Hasbro subsidiary. Shortly after the court issued its order, a visit
to <www.candyland.com> yielded only a screen carrying a large
"NEWS FLASH" graphic and explaining that due to court order in the
Doonan Trailer, Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18687 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1997) (holding
exercise of personal jurisdiction improper).
170. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985
(1996).
171. See, e.g., Toys 'R' Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1838 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
172. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., No. C96 130WD, 1996
WL 84853 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996).
173. See Marie D'Amico, Turning trademarks topsy-turvy on the Net, DIGITAL MEDIA,
Oct. 1996.
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Hasbro litigation, those wishing to access the site need to use the new
URL, <www.adultplayground.com/>. The screen closed with a plea for
adults to limit children's access to adult content on the Net by using
blocking software such as Surf Watch, Net Nanny or Cybersitter. The
"<candyland.com>" site is no longer active.
Similar instances of dilution have occurred on the web when adult
content sites have borrowed well known characters for display on those
sites. Such situations are relatively straight forward, but increasingly
difficult to police as the web expands. The more difficult dilution ques-
tions, as is true outside of cyberspace, are those that do not involve
sexually explicit or otherwise morally offensive content.
The recent case regarding the <gateway.com> domain involves such
questions. Gateway 2000, a personal computer manufacturer, holds a
federal trademark registration for GATEWAY 2000. Concerned that
another company had registered the <gateway.con> domain, Gateway
2000 brought a dilution claim in federal court.74 The proprietor of
<gateway.com> had used some form of the term "gateway" as part of its
electronic address since 1988 and had registered the domain in 1990.
Founded in 1985, Gateway 2000 could not prove to the court's satisfac-
tion that its common law mark GATEWAY was already famous when
the defendant registered its domain name. The court also found no evi-
dence that the defendant chose the <gateway.com> domain name with
intent to harm the plaintiff. Thus, on February 6, 1997, the court denied
Gateway 2000's request for preliminary injunctive relief on its dilution
theory. 7' The <gateway.com> domain is now operated by Gateway
2000.176
Similarly, another pending case involving alleged dilution of the
well-known ZIPPO cigarette lighter trademark poses a fundamental
question that is relevant on and off the net. 77 Specifically, it asks just
how broad is the trademark protection of the internationally famous
ZIPPO mark, which is associated with just one product: cigarette light-
ers. The defendant has not only obtained the <zippo.com> domain, but
has also applied to register several trademarks for its news service, in-
cluding ZIPPO'S DIRECT READ NEWS, SUPER ZIPPO'S NEWS
SERVICE and ZIPPO DOT COM. Zippo Manufacturing Co. ("Zippo")
has alleged dilution and trademark infringement, and will attempt to
persuade the court that Zippo Dot Coin, Inc. intended to trade on
174. See Gateway 2000, Inc. v. Gateway.com, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2144, at *3
(E.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 1997).
175. See Gateway 2000, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2144, at *12.
176. See Gateway 2000 site (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.gateway.con>.
177. See Zippo Mfg Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa.
1996)(mem.).
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Zippo's international fame and dilute the strength of its mark. The case
may set a significant precedent if ultimately decided on the merits.
The Zippo case also exemplifies the dangers in terms of negative
public relations that can arise when a trademark owner attempts a dilu-
tion claim. Lately, some challengers have found that the target may
retaliate by splashing the cease and desist letter on its web page, by
"spamming" the sender or the general public with copies of the letter or
angry "flame" letters by e-mail, and/or by taking the more traditional
route of contacting the press. Adopting this strategy, Zippo Dot Coin,
Inc. is not only fighting Zippo Manufacturing's claims of dilution in the
courtroom, but in the media.
Another recent example of this phenomenon involves Tandy Corpo-
ration's efforts regarding the RADIO SHACK name and mark. Tandy
has been surprised by the strong negative response to its efforts to force
Bianca's Smut Shack to remove "Shack" from its name. 78 Unlike an-
other web site owner who agreed to change the "Shack" in its name to
"Shak" quietly, Bianca's has waged a public relations campaign against
Tandy, which has been reported in a number of online and traditional
media. The defendants in the Fry's case also used similar methods, al-
beit unsuccessfully. 179 Holders of famous trademarks should be mindful
of these tactics when taking on small companies, who prefer to fight
electronically, rather than cease use of the offending mark.
In another dilution claim of note, the Bruderhof organization, a
variation on the Anabaptist religious order, sent a cease and desist letter
to the founders of the Usenet newsgroup <alt.support.bruderhof>.'" This
newsgroup was created for the purpose of commenting on the Bruderhof
organization. The cease and desist letter claimed that the name of the
newsgroup constituted, among other transgressions, trademark dilution
and infringement. These claims raise First Amendment and fair use
concerns, which are likely to be aired in the media whether or not the
case reaches the courts.
Finally, continuing the trend against anyone who can be character-
ized as a "cybersquatter," a federal district court in the Central District
of California recently relied on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in
ordering the defendant Internet service to sell two domain name regis-
trations, <avery.net> and <dennison.net>, to the Avery Dennison
company. 8' Defendants' enterprise had registered 12,000 surnames with
178. Bianca's Smut Shack (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.bianca.com/shack>.
179. See Fry's, supra note 15.
180. On file with author.
181. See Avery Dennison Corporation v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
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.net suffixes, with the apparent intention of allowing customers to share
surname-based domain names in order to create such e-mail addresses
as <bob@smith.net> and <nancy@smith.net>. Avery Dennison had
registered the domain names <avery.con> and <averydennison.com>,
182
so, unlike the Panavision situation, defendant's registrations would not
preclude the company's customers from finding Avery Dennison at the
most familiar .com address. Defendants argued that they merely sought
to allow multiples uses of the same domain name, and to spread the cost
of maintaining such registrations among various users.'s3 Skeptical of
defendants' true intent, however, the court held that, notwithstanding
these arguments and notwithstanding that plaintiff already owned the
domain names in the more popular .com space, the plaintiff's marks
were diluted by defendants' registration of the .net domain names and
intended licensing of the domain names to others. The court required
defendants to transfer the two domain names to the plaintiff for $300
each.' Other recent cases have examined similar issues.'
E. Licensing
Not surprisingly, given that virtually all traditional trademark issues
have found their way into cyberspace, the Net now has its first trade-
mark license litigation. The case involves the popular Internet search
engine ALTAVISTA, owned by Digital Equipment Corp. ("DEC").
186
DEC took a license to the ALTAVISTA mark from its owner, AltaVista
Technology, Inc. ("AltaVista").Y As the ALTAVISTA search engine,
<www.altavista.digital.com>, grew in popularity many searchers made
the common mistake of going to AltaVista's site instead,
<www.altavista.com> 8 Despite restrictions in the licensing agreement,
AltaVista chose to capitalize on the situation and began posting adver-
tising and making its site look more and more like a search engine. 9
Digital sued charging violation of the licensing agreement, trademark
infringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution, and the court
182. See id. at 1341.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1342.
185. Other recent decisions discussing causes of action for dilution involving the Inter-
net include: Lozano Enters. v. La Opinion Publ'g Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20372 (C.D.
Cal. 1997); Teletech Customer Care Management, Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F.Supp. 1407
(C.D. Cal. 1997); Toys 'R' Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 29, 1996).
186. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F.Supp. 456,459 (D. Mass.
1997).
187. See id.
188. See id. at 477-78.
189. See id. at459-61.
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granted DEC's request for a preliminary injunction.' 9° While the case
includes a unique fact pattern, more licensing disputes can be expected
on the Net in the future.
F. Trademark Searching and Policing
Just as the web challenges traditional notions of trademark use, ter-
ritoriality and infringement and offers new opportunities for testing
principles like dilution, it also raises new challenges to clearing trade-
marks for availability and identifying and investigating potential
infringements.
Traditionally, companies have cleared trademarks for use by relying
on a search provided by a commercial vendor, such as Corsearch or
Thomson & Thomson. Most such search vendors have added to their
U.S. searches a domain name section identifying potentially conflicting
domains registered through NSI. To date, none of these vendors has de-
veloped or is offering a web search beyond domains or a search of
domains registered by entities other than NSI.
The problem for the company looking for a name is obvious: the
trademark search, including domains, may not identify a trademark that
actually is in use on the web. As noted above, in this country, trademark
rights arise as a result of use; trademark registration is not a precondi-
tion to establishing rights. While that reality has always made it
impossible to guarantee that a trademark search has picked up every
preexisting use of a potential mark, that uncertainty is magnified in
spades on the web.
A similar problem arises with regard to trademark policing. Ob-
taining trademark searches at regular intervals from a search service, or
employing a watch service, two traditional tools for policing unauthor-
ized use of similar marks, likely will not tell the whole story. To fill this
gap, several companies now offer services that monitor the web for po-
tential infringers of a particular trademark. The first service of this kind
was MarkWatch, now owned and operated by Datalytics, Inc.,
<www.markwatch.com> which, for an annual $900 fee, will monitor the
web, usenet postings, the NSI domain registry, and on-line newswires."'
Similar monitoring services are now also offered by: Net Searchers, a
London-based firm. <www.netsearchers.co.uk> 2 and The Trademark
190. See id. at 459.
191. MarkWatch (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.markwatch.com/intel>.
192. Net Searchers (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.netsearchers.co.uk
frames.htm>.
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Checker service offered by MicroPatent, <www.marksearch.com> 9 3
While no service can guarantee that it will locate every single Internet
reference to a mark, they cover quite a bit of ground. Ultimately, the
value of these services, and their adequacy in addressing the challenges
facing trademark holders, will be proven as the Internet and its impact
on trademark law continues to evolve.
193. MicroPatent, Trademark Web (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.
marksearch.com/o/trademearkweb9809.html>.
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